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Articles

The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A
Historical Perspective
Samantha Barbas*
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in their famous Harvard
Law Review article The Right to Privacy, called for a new legal right that
would allow the victims of truthful but embarrassing press publicity to sue
in tort and recover damages for emotional harm.1 Currently, in most states,
it constitutes a tort if the disclosure of "matter concerning the private life
of another" would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and the
matter is not "of legitimate concern to the public." If the disclosed subject
matter is of legitimate public concern, the newsworthiness privilege
immunizes the disclosure.2
*

Ph.D., History, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. Stanford Law School.

1. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Priiacy,4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). This
piece is generally regarded as one of the most influential law review articles in American history (it
"did nothing less than add a chapter to our law," in the words of Roscoe Pound). Melville B. Nimmer,
The Right ofPublicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).

2.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D (1977).
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However, for all intents and purposes, the public disclosure of private
facts tort-one of the four branches of the privacy tort,3 the "mass
communication tort of privacy"---is generally regarded as "dead." 5
"Stunted," an "anachronism," and "surprisingly weak," at best.6 Scholars
have urged that its "remains" be formally "interred."7
The standard response given in the scholarly literature for the "death" is
the broad definition of newsworthiness. Because courts generally consider
virtually everything that appears in the news media to be newsworthy, or
of "legitimate public concern," it has become nearly impossible to win a
public disclosure suit. But why did newsworthiness, in the words of Harry8
Kalven, Jr., become "so overpowering as to virtually swallow the tort"?
The literature is largely silent on this question, pointing only to courts'
historical resistance to restrictions on the publication of truthful
information 9 and to the infamous Sidis case from 1941, which employed
an expansive understanding of newsworthiness roughly synonymous with
public curiosity. 10
There is more to the story than this, and that is what this Article
3. The four branches are intrusion upon the seclusion of another, unreasonable publicity given to
another's private life, appropriation of another's name and likeness, and publicity that unreasonably
places another in a false light before the public. See William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REV. 383
(1960).
4. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 329 (1966).
5. Jonathan Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Public
Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 426 (1996) ("[O]ne third of the Supreme Court and most of privacy
academics have pronounced dead the more than century-old tort of public disclosure of private facts.")
In FloridaStar v. BJF,491 U.S. 524 (1989), where the Court held that liability cannot result from the
disclosure of private facts already in public records, Justice White's dissent states that the majority had
"obliterated one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the twentieth century." Id. at 553.
6. Rodney A. Smolla, Accountingfor the Slow Growth ofAmerican Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L.
REV. 289,290 (2002).
7. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren & Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983) (arguing that the privacy tort cannot be reconciled with
freedom of speech); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy,News and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1177 (1992) (asking that the tort be "formally interred").
8. Kalven, supra note 4, at 336 ("There is force to the simple contention that whatever is in the
news media is by definition newsworthy, that the press must in the nature of things be the fimal arbiter
of newsworthiness. The cases admittedly do not go quite this far, but they go far enough to decimate
the tort."). See Linda Woito & Patrick McNulty, The PrivacyDisclosureTort: Should the Community
DecideNewsworthiness?, 64 IOWA L. REV. 185, 195-6; Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 353; Thomas I.
Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 342
(1979); see also Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundationsof the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. I
(1976); Everette E. Dennis, The Press and the Public: A DefinitionalDilemma, 23 DEPAUL L. REV.
937 (1973);.Theodore L. Glasser, Resolving the Press-Privacy Conflict: Approaches to the
Newsworthiness Defense, 4 COMM. & L. 23, 24 (Spring 1982).
9. Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 311 ("[T]he historical evidence suggests that the framers of the
First Amendment would have viewed restraints imposed by tort law on accurate speech ... as
inappropriate.").
10. Sidis v. F-R. Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). See James Q. Whitman, The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1209 (2004); Robert Post,
The Social Foundationsof Privacy:Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV.
957, 999-1003 (1989).
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explains. The moribund tort has generated a surprisingly vast body of
scholarly literature. Virtually none of it, however, offers anything in the
way of a historical or sociological analysis of the tort's demise and the
development of the broad newsworthiness standard. A more
comprehensive explanation could be achieved by understanding privacy as
a historically contingent construct. At any given time, a society calls on
privacy law to do certain kinds of work-to validate particular social
structures, practices, and ethics. 1 To understand it, we need to look deeply
into the social tensions we are asking it to ameliorate at any given
moment.' 2 This paper contextualizes and historicizes the "death" of the
legal action for public disclosure of private facts and suggests that history
may help us understand some of the tensions that lie beneath our current
debates over mass media and privacy.
I trace the privacy tort's death to the period between roughly 1920 and
1940, an era that saw the rapid growth and transformation of both old and
new media, including newspapers, magazines, radio, and motion pictures.
It was a time of "dramatic tensions" that shaped American culture,' 3
marked by a national focus on the issue of culture and communications. 4
Two broad cultural shifts in this period undermined the public disclosure
tort. One was a cultural devaluation of privacy, in the sense of concealing
one's private self from public view. By the 1930s, a certain degree of
public self-exposure was not only considered desirable but inevitable. The
other change was an expansion of the definition of "the news" to
encompass a wide variety of information, including private facts, and a
reassessment of the significance of the news media to modern social life.
We see the emergence of the concept of "the public's right to know" about
the world through the news media, and the idea that the purpose of the
news is not only to inform citizens about the complex workings of modern
society but to generate public discourse. For the news media to achieve
this function, there must be robust legal and constitutional protection for a
free press, and news content must be "as extensive as the range of (the
public's) interests and concerns."' 5
11. Privacy law is a "way oforganizing society." J. Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin,Function, and
Future,9 J. LEGAL. STUD. 649 (1980).
12. As Jane Gaines writes, from a sociological perspective, lawsuits represent trouble spots.
Where social norms do not function effectively, the law must perform ameliorative functions. JANE
GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 11 (1991).

13. WARREN SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY 268 (1984).
14. Id. at 260 ("There is a sharpening and a focusing on the issue of culture and
communications.... all agreed that there was a new world and that communications in large part had
helped make it.").
15. This phrase was used in the 1947 Report of the Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the
Press, a report by a group of philosophers, historians, and law professors organized to study the press
in America. A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION:
NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES AND BOOKS (1947).
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The public disclosure tort cases of this era validated and furthered these
trends, bringing the force of law to bear on changing social conditions and
norms. In many of these cases, judges expressed an idea that Justice
Brennan would neatly summarize many years later: that "exposure of the
self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community."' 6 Addressing First Amendment concerns both explicitly and
implicitly, the courts described a right of the press to publish on public
affairs, a category that included "personalities" and "private social affairs
and prevailing fashions involving individuals who make no bid for
publicity."' 7 The public disclosure cases aired ideas about the social
functions of the news media and the dynamics of media consumption that
both tracked and foreshadowed the Supreme Court's analysis in its cases
expanding constitutional protection under the First Amendment to publish
truthful material on matters of public concern. The saga of the death of the
public disclosure tort is part of the story of how we made the historic
decision to begin to legitimize, and even endorse mass media's steady
expansion of the scope of public discourse.
Even though the public disclosure tort may no longer be effective as a
legal remedy against media disclosures, it has remained a live topic of
interest among legal academics. Scholars have defended the public
disclosure tort, citing the negative social and personal effects of unwanted
media publicity and the failure of social norms and structures to
adequately protect privacy and reputation. They point out that humiliating
publicity not only damages individual dignity but impedes the formation
of authentic relationships and dissuades people from participating in
public life. 8 Privacy, they argue, is essential to the same goals that we
seek to safeguard through the First Amendment-individual autonomy
and participatory democracy. 9
In calling for greater legal protection for the disclosure of private facts
16. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1974).
17. Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, 139 Misc. 290, 292 (1931).
18. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure,2003 DUKE L.J .967, 1040, 1048 (2003) ("disclosure protections are justified... because
private information will lead to judging out of context.., the bright spotlight of the media can deter
capable people from seeking public office or speaking publicly about important issues."). See also
Daniel J, Solove, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET
(2007). Thomas Emerson, one ofthe most distinguished First Amendment scholars, wrote that privacy
and the law of freedom ofpress are "mutually supportive," and both "vital features of the basic system
of individual rights." Emerson, supra note 8. On privacy, or freedom from unwanted exposure, as a
fundamental right, see Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court
Justice and the Philosopher,28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974); STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND
HUMAN DIGNITY.

19. See, inter alia, Ruth Gavison, Too Earlyfor a Requiem: Warren & Brandeis on Privacy
versus Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437 (1991); Sean Scott, The Hidden FirstAmendment Values of
Privacy,71 WASH. L. REV. 683 (1996); Peter L. Felcher and Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,Publicity,and
the Portrayalof Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); Peter Edelman, Free Press v.
Privacy,Haunted by the Ghost ofJusticeBlack,68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1210 (1990).
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and proposing ways that such protection might be made consistent with
the First Amendment, defenders of the public disclosure tort contradict the
historical movement in the United States towards broader speech rights
and diminishing social inhibitions on self-exposure. 2° That historical
movement began in the interwar period, when the culture, driven by
economic, technological, intellectual, and demographic shifts, began to
articulate a collective commitment to the public's "right to know" that
placed free speech values over privacy.
Part IA. turns back to the origins of the privacy tort in the Victorian era.
It explains why Warren and Brandeis assigned great importance to the
concealment of the private self, why private facts had no place in their
imagined universe of public discourse, and why they were profoundly
threatened by journalism that appeared to usurp what they perceived as the
individual's right to autonomous public self-presentation. Part 1B. then
looks at the destruction of this ethos with the rise of a "culture of selfexposure," which prized the public display of inner traits and feelings, and
a modern regime of media surveillance where private citizens assumed the
risk of publicity outside the home. Courts in the 1920s and 30s often
ignored the pleas of privacy plaintiffs, recognizing not only the potential
prestige of media publicity but the practical impossibility of complete
control over self-presentation and privacy in public.
Part II looks at the rise of the newsworthiness concept and the social
attitudes that informed it. I explore four different social and legal
conversations in the interwar period where the definition of the news, and
the question of the relationship between the news, public curiosity, open
debate, and the public good, were debated and articulated. These
overlapping discourses expressed similar perspectives on the social virtues
of a free flow of information on matters of public concern, a domain that
extended in some cases to the far reaches of popular publishing. This idea
was also encapsulated in the "right to know," a phrase which began to be
articulated widely in the World War II period.2" The "right to know," and
the social and constitutional significance of speech on "matters of public
concern," have been key concepts in the evolution of freedom of speech
and press in America, yet their historical origins have not been analyzed. I
illustrate that these ideas were developed, in part, in public disclosure
cases involving the newsworthiness defense in the 1930s and 40s. As
such, these "newsworthiness cases" are an important but unacknowledged
20. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech andInformation Privacy: The Troubling Implications
of a Right to Stop Peoplefrom Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049 (2000) (on the chilling
effect of the tort and its incompatibility with First Amendment values).
21. Associated Press director Kent Cooper was credited with originating the phrase in 1945. See
Kiyul Uhm, The Cold War Communication Crisis: The Right to Know Movement, JOURNALISM &
MASs COMM. Q., 82:1 (Spring 2005), 131-47.
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source of modern legal thought on the subject of freedom of speech and
22
press in this era.
Central to the paper is an analysis of several significant appellate cases
involving media publicity of private facts and images between 1890 and
the 1950s. Although the focus is on the public disclosure tort, I also
examine cases that would be considered, under Prosser's well-known fourpart division of the tort,23 to be "false light" cases (involving the
publication of true facts that present a person in an unflattering light) and
"appropriation" cases (actions for the dignitary harm stemming from the
unauthorized commercial use of a person's image), which in this period
drew on similar understandings of privacy as the right to determine one's
own public image.2 4 I situate these cases in their historical context by
examining other contemporary sources-popular culture, legal
scholarship, academic criticism-with which they entered into dialogue.25
Using popular texts that are routinely drawn on by cultural historians, I
demonstrate that legal doctrines of tort were informed by the consumption
of popular culture, and modern free speech doctrine emerged from, among
sources, tabloids and celebrity journalism.
While the public disclosure tort was viable in the late nineteenth century
when Warren and Brandeis wrote, its social and legal meanings shifted
when the Victorian values that rationalized the tort were reworked in the
modern era. Through the chronicling of the rise and fall of the Warren and
Brandeis invention, this Article tells a story about how America became a
modern mass-mediated society, and how that process was intertwined with
social and legal debates over privacy and the media. There was a sea
change in the social experience of privacy and publicity in the period I
describe, and tort doctrines of privacy played an unacknowledged role in
facilitating that shift, one that in turn shaped the contours of the law.
22. In general, historians of free speech in America have tended to overlook the interwar period,
although these years saw the foundations of the civil libertarian position on the First Amendment. For
work on this period, see STEPHEN FELDMAN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: A HISTORY (2008); and MARK GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS

LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991). Freedom of speech was embedded in the "collective
consciousness" of this period, yet the development of the law governing speech and press is often
explained as if the broader "social milieu never existed." See Bradley Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit:
The MakingofAmerica 's FirstFreedom, 1909-1931,40 WM. &MARY L. REV. 557 (1998).
23. Prosser, supra note 3, at 389.
24. Prosser defined the appropriation tort as protecting the commercial value of personal image.
This is generally now designated as the "right of publicity." See Prosser, supra note 3, at 401.
However, as I discuss, appropriation was originally based on dignitary, not economic harm. See
Robert Post, RereadingWarren & Brandeis: Privacy, Property, andAppropriation,41 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 647, 671 (1990).
25. As Jane Gaines writes, judicial opinions help us understand the consciousness that is
dominant at any given time in history because they support the function of institutional justification.
"The significance of studying judicial opinions as cultural texts is that .. . we see how a sphere of
activity other than the law makes its inconsistencies felt in legal doctrine." GAINES, supra note 12, at
!1.
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PART I
A. The originsof the rightto privacy
In 1890, Samuel Warren was a wealthy and prominent Boston lawyer,
and Louis Brandeis, the future Supreme Court justice, was Warren's
former Harvard classmate and law partner. That year, they wrote the
"Right to Privacy," allegedly because of Warren's outrage over an item
concerning the marriage of his niece that appeared in a Boston society
column.26 The article targeted what the authors believed to be one of the
most offensive aspects of contemporary journalism-the publishing of
private facts in the form of gossip and "personality journalism."27 This
section discusses the assumptions about self and society that undergirded
the creation of the public disclosure tort and the nineteenth century culture
of self-concealment. Over time, as those background norms shifted, the
culture of restraint collided with, and ultimately yielded a brash new,
modern ethos of self-exposure.
Before the 1830s, newspapers had been affiliated with the major
political parties and predominantly geared towards a readership of
educated men. However, in that decade the American newspaper as we
know it- a publication devoted to current happenings and "public affairs"
-developed through "penny papers." Pitched at a working class audience,
these papers printed "human interest journalism," presenting the news so
that it read like entertainment.28 The term "human interest stories" was
first used in the offices of the New York Sun in the 1830s to designate the
"chatty little reports of tragic or comic incidents in the lives of the
people., 29 As advertising became the primary means of subsidizing
newspaper publishing, the human interest approach became a way to
attract readers and sell those readers to advertisers. Human interest
journalism publicized material from the dark recesses of life: crime
reports, gossip, trivia, and other pieces of fact (or as the case may be,
fiction) formerly considered too mundane, lurid, or private to be
published.3" After the Civil War, most of the papers ran gossip columns,
26.

See James H. Barron, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890):

Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875 (1979); DONALD PEMBER, PRIVACY
AND THE PRESS (1972); Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy,21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1,
25-27 (1979).
27. See generally CHARLES PONCE DE LEON, SELF-EXPOSURE: HUMAN INTEREST JOURNALISM
AND THE EMERGENCE OF CELEBRITY IN AMERICA, 1890-1940, at 54 (2001).
28. SILAS BENT, BALLYHOO: THE VOICE OF THE PRESS 400 (1927).
29. HELEN MCGILL HUGHES, THE HUMAN INTEREST STORY 13 (1940).
30. See DE LEON, supra note 27, at 54; MICHAEL SCHUDsON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 89 (1981); see also GERALD BALDASTY, THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1992); HAZEL DICKEN-GARC1A,
JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS INNINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1989).
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and some of the larger papers had separate columns dealing with
politicians, businessmen, society figures, writers, and athletes.3
The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the rise of yellow
journalism, the highly sensationalistic news reporting pioneered by
publishers Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst.32 Hearst "came
to reject all news stories which did not contain the thrill of sensation loved
by the man on the street and the woman in the kitchen."33 The newspaper
tabloid originated in the 1880s with the New York Daily Graphic, a
picture-laden sheet that carried the motto "great crimes, the terrific
accidents, the society shaking scandals must be illustrated."34 One of the
New York newspapers employed a photographer to stand in the street and
take snapshots of every person who appeared to possibly be important.35
Between 1870 and 1900, as a result of technology and a growing urban
population, the readership of daily urban newspapers increased 400%.36
These papers, which attracted a wide working and middle class audience,
made reading a pastime of the masses.3 7
Social elites were disgusted and threatened by the popular press, and a
battle over journalism ensued-a "proxy for class conflict," in the words
of journalism historian Michael Schudson. 38 The last quarter of the
nineteenth century was a time of social upheaval that saw the first
glimmerings that "that the social reality preserving the formal order was
beginning to crack", according to historian Lary May. 39 New channels of
communication and transportation-telephones, telegraphs, masscirculation publications, railroads-condensed
time and space.
Industrialization and corporatization undermined the fabled economic
individualism of the frontier era, and small towns and communities were
being subsumed by impersonal national bureaucracies.' n
The conservative backlash against these changes is well-known: antiimmigration laws, crackdowns against labor, and numerous attempts to
control the flow of information through censorship and press regulation.
Criticism of the popular press became so voluminous that it could almost
31. DE LEON, supra note 27, at 52.
32. See DAVID RALPH SPENCER, THE YELLOW JOURNALISM: THE PRESS AND AMERICA'S
EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER 16 (2007).
33. LEONARD TEEL, THE PUBLIC PRESS, 1900-1945, at 7 (2006).
34. See SIMON BESSIE, JAZZ JOURNALISM: THE STORY OF THE TABLOID NEWSPAPERS 56 (1969).
35. The Right ofPrivacy,N. Y. TIMES, July 19, 1896.
36. PEMBER, supra note 26, at 10.
37. TOM LEONARD, NEWS FOR ALL 92 (1995).
38. SCHUDSON, supranote 30.
39. LARY MAY, SCREENING OuT THE PAST: THE BIRTH OF MASS CULTURE AND THE MOTION
PICTURE INDUSTRY 64 (1980).

40. By the 1870s, as historian Robert Wiebe summarized, "citizens in towns and cities across the
land sensed that something fundamental was happening in their lives." ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 44 (1968).
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be called a "counter-industry," one historian writes. 4 The upper class,
which prided itself on its order and rationality, saw the sensationalistic
press as a reflection of the chaotic and disordered lives of the working
classes. The elite vision of the news was exemplified by the New York
Times, which presented serious financial and political news in a drily
factual and allegedly accurate manner.4 2 In an era when elites began to
bifurcate culture into "highbrow" and "lowbrow," the news media were
also subjected to this division.43
Between 1880 and 1890, in response to yellow journalism, reformers
throughout the country pressed for the passage of state laws to ban
sensationalistic newspapers and magazines." One California law banned
the publication of pictures or caricatures of any living person unless the
press obtained prior permission. Another law in that state required authors
to sign all potentially defamatory articles or editorials.45 These laws posed
little conflict with dominant judicial interpretations of the First
Amendment and state constitutional free speech provisions.4 6 Although
prior restraints were proscribed, subsequent punishment of speech that had
a "bad tendency," that threatened public safety or morals, was seen a
legitimate exercise of the state's police powers.4 7
The greatest offense of the new journalism, according to elites, was that
it corrupted the public sphere with private information. Trivial and
frivolous facts about "personalities" cheapened the tone of public
discourse and cluttered readers' minds, causing them to lose their sense of
proportion and discrimination.4 8 When the press displayed the details of
41. NORMAN ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW
OF LIBEL 190 (1990).
42. On the clash between entertainment and informational journalism in the 1890s, see Schudson,
supra note 30, at 89-120.
43. See LAWRENCE LEVINE, HIGHBROW LOWBROW: THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURAL HIERARCHY
INAMERICA (1988).
44. During that decade, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Indiana all passed laws that criminally punished the printing, publishing,
and selling of publications principally devoted to "criminal news, police reports, or accounts of
criminal deeds, or pictures or stories or deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime." These were described in
the Supreme Court case Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 522 (1948).
45. See LINDA LAWSON, TRUTH IN PUBLISHING: FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PRESS'S
BUSINESS PRACTICES 65-67 (1993). Congress also controlled the press through postal regulations. The
Comstock Law of 1873 made it illegal to send "obscene, lewd, and/or lascivious" material through the
mails, including information about contraception. In 1868 and 1872 Congress banned lotteries from
the mails, and also defamatory materials on envelopes and postcards. The Postal Act of 1872 granted

the second-class postal rate to periodical materials "originated and published for the dissemination of
information of a public character"; however, postal officials had tremendous discretion to deny
second-class mailing rates. See JAMES PAUL AND MURRAY SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP:
OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL 31-37 (1961).

46.

See Feldman, supra note 22, at 223. On the "bad tendency" standard in this era, see also

DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997).

47.
48.

Id.
For a good discussion of these critiques, see ROCHELLE GURSTE1N, THE REPEAL OF
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private affairs before a public audience, it blurred the boundaries between
the public and private, destroying the sacred quality of intimate life. As
Warren and Brandeis wrote:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer the
resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade, which is pursued with industry as well as
effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by
intrusion upon the domestic circle.49
"[P]ersons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate
concerns" were "being dragged into an undesirable and undesired
publicity." 5 ° This inflicted on the victim "mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."'" Gossip harmed
society by "lowering.. .social standards and morality."52 When gossip
appeared in the press, it focused public attention on trivial matters and
usurped "the place of interest in brains capable of other things." 53
Arguing that it was the function and duty of the common law to protect
against injuries to the person caused by new social circumstances, Warren
and Brandeis called for a "right to privacy" that would allow the victims
of unwanted publicity to sue in tort and recover damages for emotional
harm that came from having one's image or private affairs displayed in
public. At the time, there were no legal remedies available for unwanted,
truthful publication of private facts in the press. The law of libel dealt only
with false facts, and it remedied only damages to reputation. The harm that
the Warren and Brandeis tort would redress was not a material assault to
one's standing in the community, as in libel, but hurt feelings. Warren and
Brandeis justified their proposed privacy right by linking it to opinions
holding that individuals have property rights and contractual claims to
their private letters and personal photographs. Therefore, one would also
have a legal right to exclusive possession and control of one's public
persona. Pointing to a general trend in the law towards protection of
human emotions, not merely property and the body, they described the
right to privacy not as a proprietary right like reputation but a spiritual

RETICENCE (1996).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Warren & Brandeis, supranote 1, at 196.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
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interest rooted in "personality., 54 The right to privacy protected
individuals against public disclosure and therefore would shield only
private facts communicated in a mass medium. The tort would not punish
publications for printing information about aspects of public figures'
private lives related to their public accomplishments, a distinction drawn
from the "fair comment" privilege in libel law.
As city, living brought urbanites into close and often uncomfortable
proximity with one another, the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw
widely articulated concerns with physical privacy. Like privacy in
personal affairs, private space, a symbol of wealth and gentility, was a
distinctly upper class fetish.55 Urban life inevitably blurs public and
private. Although city dwellers were strangers to one another, they were
increasingly dependent on one another and affected by each other's private
behavior. 6 Commentators noted that "the man of today lives much more
in the open than the man of a century ago." 57 The rise of mass
communications also gave people the sense of being in an open network.
To elites, these developments made protection of physical privacy more
urgent. Warren and Brandeis had lamented that the privacy of the home
was no longer sacred. They claimed that reporters eavesdropped and burst
through closed doors, and that "instantaneous photographs and newspaper
had "invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic
enterprises"
life.,, 58
And yet the "privacy" that Warren and Brandeis sought to protect was
not primarily about physical seclusion or secrecy, contrary to what some
scholars have suggested.5 9 It was, at its core, about control over private
information -specifically, the means by which individuals communicated
54. Warren &Brandeis, supra note 1,at 205.
55. See Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
281 (1966); see also Robert F. Copple, Privacy and the FrontierThesis: An American Intersection of
SelfandSociety, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 87, 88 (1989).
56.
See DAVID PAUL NORD, COMMUNITIES OF JOURNALISM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
NEWSPAPERS AND THEIR READERS 127 (2001); ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8-22 (1967).
57. The Right ofPrivacy,N. Y. TIMES, July 28, 1904.

58. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1,at 195; see also Robert Mensel, Kodakers Lying in Wait:
Amateur Photographyandthe Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, AM. Q. 24-25 (1991).
59. In 1940, Louis Nizer, in an influential article, argued that Warren & Brandeis called for legal
protection of the right "to live a life of seclusion and anonymity" and enjoy the "dignity of solitude."
Nizer, The Rightof Privacy:A HalfCentury'sDevelopments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 528 (1940).
As Thomas Emerson notes, there is no "unified theory" or definition of privacy. Emerson, The Right
of Privacy and the Freedom of the Press, supra note 8, at 340. Zimmerman also notes that "the
commentators are in considerable disagreement over how to describe the purposes of this tort."
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight, supra note 7, at 321. See also Robert Post, Three
Conceptionsof Privacy 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2000) ("[P]rivacy is a value so complex, so entangled in
competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I
sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all."); William M. Beaney, The Right to
Privacy and American Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (1966) ("Even the most strenuous
advocate of a right to privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and
scope of this right."); Richard Parker, A Definitionof Privacy,27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275, 281 (1974).
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their identities to others. To Warren and Brandeis, "privacy" was the
individual's "right of determining ...to what extent (one's) thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others,"' or in the
words of E.L. Godkin, a "right to decide how much knowledge of ...
personal thought and feeling. . .how much knowledge ...of his tastes and
habits, of his own private doings and affairs ...the public at large shall
have." The authors feared that mass media would undermine traditional
rituals of public self-presentation, rituals that were constitutive of personal
identity and an essential part of the socialization processes that formed the
basis of community. By rupturing these established modes of selfpresentation, the "new" journalism threatened both the viability of the
community and the integrity of the private self.
1. ConcealmentandExposure
To understand why Warren and Brandeis had such deep investment in
control over private information and public self-presentation, we need to
understand something about the Victorian vision of the public sphere and
the social meaning of the self-presentation rituals followed by the elite at
that time. In that era, presentation of the self in public was, compared to
modern standards, a relatively formal, plotted event governed by
established codes of etiquette. Elites viewed etiquette as a set of hard,
coercive rules not unlike formal law; it complemented legal codes or in
some cases, took up the slack when the law failed. As one late nineteenth
century writer noted, "etiquette" is "to society what civil law is to a
country"; it "is the barrier which society draws around itself as a
protection against offenses the 'law' cannot touch."62
The primary goal of self-presentation was the concealment of the
private self in public. One created a public mask or fagade that reflected
not so much who one really was, but the dignified, controlled self one
hoped to display before others. The necessity of creating a public "front"
was a response to what sociologist Richard Sennett has described as the
"audience problem" 6 3-the problem of creating a reputation in a city
where no one knows you. This dilemma surfaced in the period between
1820 and 1860, which saw the fastest rate of urban growth in American
history. In the city, people judged each other largely on surface
appearances, so first impressions were important.' 4
60. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 198.
61. E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen to His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER'S MAG. 65 (July
1890).
62. JOHN KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY URBAN
AMERICA 61 (1991).
63. RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 86 (1989)
64. Schudson, supra note 30, at 59-60. On the importance of reputation in cities, see LAWRENCE
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Away from the small town communities they came from, men and
women who migrated to cities often tried to conceal their backgrounds and
remake themselves socially. To succeed in the city, one had to dissemble
to a certain degree, yet to win the trust of others, one needed also to
convey an image of sincerity. This was not easy. Because it was generally
believed that one's private inner self, or "personality," manifested
immediately in one's appearance-in one's dress, demeanor, and
gestures-the concealment of one's true feelings and intentions required
careful attention to self-presentation.65 In general, self-control-mastery
over desire-was the hallmark of the Victorian ethos and a natural
outgrowth of a society that stressed producer values and a stringent work
ethic. A model of self-presentation that stressed self-concealment and the
suppression of spontaneous emotion externalized inner virtue, bridging the
social and the moral.
The social fiction that enabled the controlled public performance was
the construct of "separate spheres," the public and the private. The line
between the two was one in which civility-epitomized by cosmopolitan,
public behavior-was separated from nature, represented by the family. 66
The private sphere, governed by women and feminine sensibilities, was
the domestic realm of emotion and intimate relationships; the public
sphere, the male domain of competitive commercial relations.67 The
private, where true emotions and impulses flourished, served as the
backstage to one's public performance. An individual "performed" a
restrained identity in the public realm, but in private he dropped his front,
stepped out of character, and revealed his true self.68 As sociologist Erving
Goffman noted in his famous study The Presentationof Self in Everyday
Life, recourse to the back regions enabled the perfect expressive control
demanded in the front regions.6 9 Advice books portrayed the middle-class
home as both a protected setting for personal interaction and a place where
inhabitants rehearsed the roles they would perform in public life.7 Genteel
audiences followed established codes of reception-"laws of tact" that

FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS 27 (2005).

65. As Sennett writes, in the nineteenth century, "people ... were disposed to make more and
more of differences in the immediate impressions they made upon each other, to see these differences,
indeed, as the very basis of social existence." The immediate impressions different people made were
taken to be their "personalities." SENNETT, supra note 63, at 151-2.
66. SENNETr, supranote 63, at 18.
67. The classic piece on gender and the public-private distinction is Barbara Welter, The Cult of
True Womanhood, 1820-1860,18 AM. Q. 151-174 (1966).
68. See KAREN HALTUNNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED WOMEN 104 (1982); KASSON,
RUDENESS AND CIVILITY, supra note 58, at 61, 116 (1991); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION
OF SELF IN DAILY LIFE (1959).

69. GOFFMAN, supranote 68.
70. KASSON supranote 62, at 165.
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called on them to ignore the flaws in other people's social performances.71
The rituals of self-presentation protected reputations, which had both
economic and moral value. Occurring in intimate contexts mediated by
shared values, they were also constitutive of community. In upholding
these codes of self-performance and reception, communities enforced and
policed social norms.7 2 Oral gossip also maintained communityparticipants affirmed social values by criticizing those who transgressed
thenm--but printed gossip did not: private facts that appeared in the press,
by removing the practice of gossip from the community, negated its
socializing functions. This is why the right to privacy would punish
73
written but not oral gossip.
Defamation law had long recognized the particular social and
reputational harms posed by false statements in print. Plaintiffs suing for
defamatory oral statements, for slander, had to plead special damages, but
in the law of libel damages were presumed, because of the wide audience
and permanency of the communication. In a geographically bounded
community, a slander victim could confront one's accusers or rehabilitate
one's image through counter speech, but there was little recourse when the
material was spread to a wide audience in permanent written form.7 4 When
libelous or embarrassing information about an individual was
disseminated through mass media, the victim lost his cooperative audience
and control over the way his image would be received; readers and
viewers would interpret it without the interpretive codes and background
facts available to members of the community.
Between 1890 and 1910, men and women throughout the country
brought "invasion of privacy" claims that implicated these concerns with
unwanted exposure of the vulnerable private self, the inappropriate
blurring of public and private, and loss of control over public image. By
1910, eight states had recognized a right to privacy-five at common law
and four by statute.75 Several other states that did not officially recognize a
71. HALTUNNENsupra note 68, at 107; see GOFFMAN, supra note 68, at 234.
72. Post, Social Foundations,supra note 10, at 1008 ("[P]rivacy is simply a label that we use to
identify one aspect of the many forms of respect by which we maintain a community."); Lawrence
Lessig, Post-Constitutionalism,94 MICH.L. REV. 1421, 1450 (1996) ("[A] community is a form of life
in part constituted by a structure of sanctions.").
73. As Robert Post writes, "the contemporary media separate gossip as a noun from gossip as a
verb - we can read gossip but not partake in it. So gossip does not enforce community boundaries and
threatens community values." The Legal Regulation of Gossip, in GOOD GOSSIP 66 (Robert Goodman
& Aaron Ben-Ze'ev eds., 1994).
74. See Post, The Legal Regulation of Gossip, in GOOD GOSSIP, supra note 73, at 67 (arguing that
"defamation conveyed by slander, because of its contextualization in oral conversation" can serve
purposes of upholding community norms of civil speech, whereas defamation by written
communication cannot.").
75. At common law: Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance, 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Pritchett v.
Knox County Bd. of Comm'rs, 42 Ind. App. 3 (1908); Foster-Millburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424
(1909); Schulman v. Whitaker, 17 La. 704 (1906); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910 (1907). By
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tort action for invasion of privacy nonetheless granted recovery on other
grounds, such as breach of contract and unjust enrichment, often citing the
Warren and Brandeis article approvingly.76 In these cases, a person whose
private facts or picture appeared in the press sought damages both for
humiliation and injured reputation among her peers. Privacy claims were
often brought together with libel claims, with libel addressing loss of
reputation and privacy redressing the emotional and dignitary harm that
occurred from loss of control over self-presentation." 7
Press exposure removed the processes of individual image-making from
the community, yet the sting of the misrepresentation was often felt
intimately. In a 1909 Rhode Island case involving claims for both privacy
and libel, Henry v. Cherry & Webb, the plaintiff appeared in an
automobile ad that was printed in the Providence Evening Bulletin. The
picture was "easily recognized by his friends and acquaintances," who
made him "the object of much ridicule, scoff, and gibes," apparently
believing that he had willingly posed for the advertisement and endorsed
the cars.78 In a 1911 Missouri case, Munden v. Harris,the picture of a
young boy was used without authorization in an advertisement for a
jewelry store. Holding that the boy had a cause of action for invasion of
privacy, the court noted that both the association with jewelry and the
public display of his image would be deeply embarrassing for a five-yearold child, because "it does not require any imagination to realize what a
suggestive handle it would give to the teasing propensities of his
fellows., 79 In FosterMillburn Co. v. Chinn, a Kentucky court in 1909 held
that a Senator whose name had been falsely used in an advertisement for
patent medicine had a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The
advertisement, which circulated in a pamphlet, caused him to be "ridiculed
and laughed at by his friends and acquaintances." 80
statute: New York, 1903, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS Law; Utah, 1909, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8 and 76-49; Virginia, 1904, VA. CODE ANN.§ 8-650.
76. See, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis, 19 N.Y.S. 264 (1892); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y. Supp. 908 (1893).
Both suits were clearly suggested by The Right to Privacy, and the courts based their decisions on
Warren & Brandeis's theories. See also Ben Bratman, Brandeis & Warren's Right to Privacy and the
Birth ofa Right to Privacy,69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002).
77. In many ways, privacy claims were really another route to a defamation claim, yet judges
often regarded them separately-the indignity that flowed from losing the ability to present one's own
public "front" as one wished was considered substantial enough to merit an independent cause of
action. That legal actions for invasions of privacy had in many cases become another route to
defamation claims was noted by a newspaper editor in a 1915 book called The Coming Newspaper, in
which he observed that most states had made their libel laws stricter "as a response to intrusive
journalism." Quoted in GURSTEIN, supra at note 48, at 171.
78. Henry v. Cherry & Webb 73 At. 97, 98 (1909). The court stated that the right of privacy did
not exist in natural or in constitutional law, and it had neither the desire nor the power to create
precedent.
79. 134 S.W. 1076,1079 (1911).
80. 134 Ky. 424, 430 (1909). The Supreme Court was asked to, but did not address the public
disclosure tort in the case Peck v. Tribune Co., from 1909. In that case a plaintiff brought privacy and
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As these cases suggest, the usual privacy claim in this period involved
the unauthorized publishing of a person's photograph. Given
contemporary perspectives on photography, thought to manifest the
innermost identity of the person, it is not surprising that photographic
appropriation would be viewed as deeply injurious to the individual's
dignity and perceived right to autonomous self-presentation. As historian
Alan Trachtenberg has written, the aim of nineteenth century portrait
photographers was to "capture the soul," and professional photographers
"developed a rationale which held that the photographer looked through
surfaces to depths [and] treated the exterior surface of persons as signs or
expressions of inner truths, of interior reality.",81 The turn of the century
saw a massive social outcry over the burgeoning paparazzi, which led
states and municipalities to enact anti-paparazzi laws.82 Even though the
face of a person in a public setting was technically not "private,"
circulating a photograph of it was considered an invasion of privacy
because of the photo's inherently personal nature.
The famous privacy case of Pavesich v. New EnglandLife Insurance
Co.,83 in which Georgia in 1905 became the first state to recognize the
privacy tort, is a classic encapsulation of the Victorian perspective on the
relation between the public and private and the connection of the
photographic image to the inner self. The photo of an artist, Pavesich, had
appeared in an insurance company's advertisement that was published in
the Atlanta Constitution. Pavesich had posed for the photo but did not
authorize its use in the ad. The Georgia Supreme Court overruled the
lower court and held that he had a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
Pavesich had lost the ability to give his own public performance; to
"choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which [he] will
submit himself to the public gaze,"' "to exhibit himself to the public at all
libel claims against the Chicago Sunday Tribune, which had published her image in a whiskey ad. In
the ad, the plaintiff, Mrs. Peck, had been described as a nurse named Mrs. Schuman. Mrs. Peck was
not a nurse, and she was an abstainer. The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision to uphold the
trial court's directed verdict for the defendant, stating that there was a jury question as to whether the
ad was libelous and would hurt her reputation as a respectable woman with a "serious and respectable
class in the community." The Court did not reach the invasion of privacy claim, suggesting that to do
so it would need to consider whether privacy should be recognized an independent tort, which was
more than the case required. "It is enough for the present case that the law should at least be prompt to
recognize the injuries that may arise from an unauthorized use in connection with other facts, even if
more subtlety is needed to state the wrong than is needed here." 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
81.

ALAN TRACHTENBERG, READING AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHS, 26,27 (1989).

82. In Chicago in 1905, the city council took action against paparazzi. President Theodore
Roosevelt led his own anti-paparazzi campaign when he instructed his secret servicemen to confiscate
cameras and, after several newspapers had published a story about his private Thanksgiving dinner,
publicly declared that his domestic affairs were "sacred" and his family would not be "made the
victims of idle gossip." The Right to Privacy,CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1905, at 10; Home is Sacred, Says
Roosevelt, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 4, 1904, at 1.
83. 122 Ga. 190; 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
84. 50 S.E. 68, 70 (1905).
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proper times, in all proper places, and in a proper manner,"" and "to
withdraw from the public gaze at such times as [he] may see fit."' 86 The
loss of this prerogative was considered such a grievous violation of
personal dignity that the judge characterized it as an assault to "personal
87
liberty.
Displayed far beyond the boundaries of any given locality, to audiences
who lacked background facts, context, and shared interpretive codes,
Pavesich's decontextualized, disembodied image was now thrown open to
the interpretive anarchy of the masses. Viewers would make crude and
unwarranted assumptions about his respectability, assaulting his dignity
and reputation. 88 Pavesich's image could now appear "upon the streets""it may ornament the bar of the saloon keeper or decorate the walls of a
brothel" and be displayed in disreputable places "where he would never go
to be gazed upon," according to the court. 89 The last quarter of the
nineteenth century saw the rise of a mass market for consumer goods, a
consumer culture, and the beginning of the heavy use of visual images in
advertisements. 90 Like the icons that had come to grace ads and packages
of cereals, soaps, and patent medicines, Pavesich's face had become a
fungible commodity, and his right to have his public reputation negotiated
by the community had been usurped by the market. 9'
Privacy, reputation, and the codes of public performance were highly
gendered. Women were thought to be private beings, and modesty was the
female ideal. Women who openly displayed their emotion in public or
who sought attention from others were not considered respectable. 92
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 80.
88. Among legal scholars, there has been much debate over the interest that the court sought to
protect in the Pavesich case. Prosser argued that it was primarily a proprietary one, and that the court
recognized Pavesich as having unwillingly surrendered pecuniary and property interests in his image.
that the unwanted
Bloustein and Kahn read the court's concerns as mainly with dignitary harmcommercialization of his image humiliated and degraded him. See Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 984 (1964); Jonathan
Kahn, BringingDignity Back to Light: PublicityRights andthe Eclipse ofthe Tort ofAppropriationof
Identity, 17 CARDozO L. REV. 213, 222 (1999). Robert Post similarly writes that Judge Cobb's
statement "conceives of commercial appropriation of a person's image as violative ofessential norms
of respect and hence as destructive of personality." Post, Rereading Warren & Brandeis: Privacy,
Property,andAppropriation,41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 671 (1990).
89. 50 S.E. 68, 80.
90. Between the end of the Civil War and 1900, total advertising expenditure increased tenfold.
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: PopularCulture andPublicityRights, 81 CAL.
L. REV.125, 156 (1992).
91. As legal scholar Jonathan Kahn has noted, the right to privacy intended to "create a legally
sanctioned space beyond the reach of market forces" at a time when there was fear about the
commodification of everyday life. Commodification denied "the conditions of individuation necessary
to the proper respect for and development of one's personhood" by rendering the individual as a
"fingible commodity." Kahn, supra note 88, at 221.
92. On modesty and gender, see Anita Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got its Gender, 10 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 441 (1989-1990).
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Although the turn of the century saw the first widespread uses of women's
images in commercial advertisements, women's appearance in public,
particularly in commercial contexts, signified sexual license and lowerclass status. 93 For this reason, the unauthorized public display of women's
photographs, especially in advertising, was considered by courts to be
particularly reprehensible. In a case from 1918, Kunz v. Allen, 94 a Kansas
appellate court held that a woman who had been filmed while shopping,
and the image used in a newsreel advertisement for a dry goods store, had
a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The ad conveyed the impression
that the plaintiff was a disreputable professional actress or model, causing
her extreme distress. 95
A similar scenario confronted the Court of Appeals of New York in
1902 in the famous case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Company.96 This case is notable, in part, because of the extraordinary and
revealing public reaction it spawned. A young girl, Abigail Roberson,
sought legal action to stop the publication of her portrait on posters
advertising Franklin Mills Flour. Even though Roberson's photograph was
flattering, the court acknowledged that its display in such crass
commercial settings as "stores, warehouses, and saloons," far outside the
communities and contexts where Robertson herself would choose to
appear, would reasonably subject a woman of modest sensibilities to
"mortifying notoriety." 7 Over a strong dissent, the court rejected her
claim, stating that there was no legal right to privacy and that recognizing
one would open the floodgates of litigation. 98
What followed was a testament to the widespread appeal of the Warren
and Brandeis critique. Throughout the country, critics of the decision
mobilized to defend Roberson's right to self-concealment. 99 Within weeks,
93. As Anita Allen and Erin Mack note, "women appear in the Warren & Brandeis article as
seduced wives and daughters." The rhetorical force of the article stems from the authors' "skillful
exploitation of social attitude about gender." Allen & Mack, supra note 92, at 458.
Defamation was also a gendered offense - for men, the most damaging attacks on their reputation
impugned their honesty and trustworthiness; for women, their reputation for chastity. See Lisa Pruitt,
Her Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 MD. L. REV. 401 (2004). On the
image of women in advertising, see CAROLYN KITSCH, THE GIRL ON THE MAGAZINE COVER (2001).
94. 102 Kan. 883 (1918).
95. Id.
96. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
97. Id. at 442.
98. Id. at 450; see also SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
INNEWYORK 10 (1954).
99. Criticizing the decision, they lamented the failure ofthe law to police the boundaries ofpublic
discourse and to protect innocent citizens "who do not care to be made notorious," especially "the
average good home-keeping wife, mother, or daughter," for whom "the thought she is likely to get her
name in the papers is appalling and enough to bring on a fainting fit." The Right of Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1902. Harper's wrote that the dissent was "marching more closely in step with the
general notion ofthe duty of the courts." HARPER'S WEEKLY 984 (1902).
Pavesich was decided after Robertson, and throughout the country papers praised the decision,
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there was a public campaign demanding that the New York state
legislature enact a statute that would legally protect individuals from
unauthorized commercial appropriation of their names, private facts, and
visual images." ° The legislature responded with Civil Rights Law
Sections 50-5 1, which made it both a misdemeanor and tort to make use of
the name, portrait, private facts, or picture of any person for "advertising
purposes or for the purpose of trade without his written consent."' 0' 1 The
forces of concealment had won, and the norms of etiquette had been
joined by the force of law.
Plaintiffs continued to bring these sorts of "privacy" claims in the early
twentieth century, but by the 1920s there was a change in the judicial and
public reactions to them. In the span of roughly two decades, American
culture witnessed a significant transformation in norms of privacy and
publicity. When the goal of self-presentation shifted from selfconcealment to self-exposure, the very concept of an "invasion of privacy"
changed. That an individual might bring the coercive force of the state to
bear on the errant columnist, the ambitious press photographer, or
appropriating adman seemed too much in an era when the pinnacle of
social achievement was, in many ways, to be recognized by others for
one's "inner" self.
B. The PersonalityIdeal
In 1897, the New York Times ran a baccalaureate speech by the
president of Vassar College in which he lamented what he saw as a
growing lust for fame among average people. "Influenced by... the love
of notoriety, men have opened the secrets of their homes, their social
entertainments and aspirations to the world."'0 2 Knowing that the papers
would publicize anything amusing or titillating, everyday people revealed
their private quirks and peccadilloes to reporters in the hopes of becoming
famous.'0 3 The genteel person, by contrast, sought "modest privacy,"
shrank from notoriety, and was "pained and distressed by anything

contrasting it to Robertson.The New York Times said that the Georgia Supreme Court had shown itself
a "more trustworthy organ of civilization" than the New York Court of Appeals. The Right to Privacy,
Apr. 23, 1905. See also The Right of Privacy,L.A. TIMES, Jul.28, 1905; The Right ofPrivacy, WASH.
POST, Jul. 13, 1905.

100. Lawrence Edward Savell, Right of Privacy- Appropriationof a Person's Name, Portraitor
Picturefor Advertising or Trade Purposes Without Prior Written Consent,History and Scope in New
York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1983).
101. The Right of Privacy,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902; see also N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. § 50. Note
that the New York law was a remedy for dignitary and emotional harm, not the commercial value of
one's image. The "right of publicity" would evolve decades later, following many cultural
transformations far removed from the developments I describe here. See Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity,supranote 1.
102. OldPrinciplesUpheld,N.Y. TIMES, Jun 8, 1897.
103.

Id.
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resembling publicity."'" Before long this sort of spotlight-seeking would
become unexceptional. As this section demonstrates, by the end of the
1920s, Americans lived in a culture where the public exposure of private
lives-of both public figures and random unknowns-had become a
central part of social life. It was the subject of popular entertainment,
major national industries, a new model of idealized self-presentation, and
a modern vision of fame.
If anything defines American life in the 1920s, it is the rise of the city
and the sudden proliferation of visual media. In 1920, the census
registered, for the first time, an equal number of Americans living within
and outside of cities. The landscape of the modem metropolis was
increasingly one of sensual overwhelm. City streets, now vibrant with
electricity, teemed with bright billboards advertising a cornucopia of
consumer products. Movie theaters appeared in urban neighborhoods, and
the average American went to the movies three or four times a week.
Newspapers reached circulation highs and, with the advent of halftone
technology, were illustrated with photographs. 105 America was becoming a
mass-mediated, urban consumer culture, and these material developments
reflected and hastened great changes in social behavior.'0 6
After World War I there was, among the middle-class, a "revolution in
manners and morals" that broke down the strict Victorian barriers of
public and private.0 7 The popularization of Freudian psychology helped
release Americans from the strictures of the nineteenth century by
validating the display of inner instincts and impulses. A burgeoning
consumer culture and advertising industry celebrated and commercialized
desire, blurring the boundaries between intimate and social experience.
The use of psychological techniques in advertising-the linkage of
consumer products to inner happiness and self-esteem-made private fears
and desires public. 8 As advertisers promised that products would make
consumers likeable, increase self-confidence, and cure halitosis, deeply
personal matters, "once thought beneath the attention of the governing

104.

Id.

105.

For circulation figures, see ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER IN AMERICA

731 (1947). In 1929, more newspapers were circulated daily in New York than the city's total
population of about 6 million.
106. As cultural historian Warren Susman summarized, "whether it is a change from a producer to
a consumer society, an order of economic accumulation to disaccumulation, industrial capitalism to
finance capitalism.., it is clear that a new social was emerging." Even more important, he writes, was
the awareness of the public that it was living through a historical shift that was fundamental. SUSMAN,
supranote 13, at 275.
107. See FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1920S
(1931); see also LYNN DUMENIL, THE MODERN TEMPER: AMERICAN CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE

1920S (1995); MAY, supra note 39; SUSMAN, supra note 13.
108. See STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF MODERN
ADVERTISING (1976); ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM (1986).
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classes, became topics of urgent public debate."'" The rise of liberal and
radical feminisms challenged earlier norms of sexual modesty," 0 and the
tone of emotional life shifted from repression to release.
Private life was exalted. Between 1880 and 1920 the number of salaried
employees increased eightfold, comprising over 60 percent of the entire
middle class."' As Americans* acknowledged the new reality that the
average middle-class worker would spend his life not as an individual
producer but as a salaried employee within a large organization, the
private sphere came to be seen as the antidote to the dulling and
dehumanizing effects of the workplace. Increasingly, there was a belief
that the organized work world thwarted the sense of freedom and
autonomy found in the open marketplace and that fulfillment and one's
"true self" could be found only in private life.112
The valorization of private life, emotional release, and the expression of
inner desire led to a new model of idealized self-presentation, what
historians have described as the "personality" ideal. Personality was
"particularly suited for the problems of self in a changed social order, the
developing consumer mass society," historian Warren Susman writes. "3
The personality ideal stressed emotions and qualities that were typically
associated with the private sphere, such as humor, warmth, and
spontaneity, traits that could be best developed in leisure time. Popular
advice manuals no longer stressed the importance of creating a controlled
public fagade that concealed one's true emotions, but manifesting one's
inner self, one's "personality" in public life by being effusive and candid.
"Be yourself is the first commandment of personality," they preached,
"and act yourself the whole of it.""' 4 In her syndicated advice column
"Daily Talks," movie star Mary Pickford reminded readers that the most
attractive people were those who had learned to "be themselves.""..5 Selfconsciousness "steals your beauty and individuality," she explained. 6 As
Henry Ford told the journalist Bruce Barton in 1921, "a young man ...
should look for the single spark of individuality that makes him different
from other folks, and develop that for all he's worth.""' 7 The "sheer
revelation" of inner impulses became fascinating. If a person could reveal
himself in public and yet do so in a groomed and stylish manner, he was
109. T.J. JACKSON LEARS, FABLES OF ABUNDANCE 137 (1995).
110. NANCY COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM (1987).
111. MAY, supra note 39, at 201.
112. MAY, supranote 39, at 200.
113. SUSMAN, supra note 13, at 280.
114. Quoted in SAMANTHA BARBAS, MovIE CRAzY: FANS, STARS AND THE CULT OF CELEBRITY
43 (2001).
115. Quoted in BARBAS, supra note 114, at 50.
116. Id.
117. Quoted in DE LEON, supra note 27, at 117.

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 22:171

18
considered to be exciting. 1
The new "personality" model did not compel complete self-exposure,
however. There were still zones of privacy considered off-limits to the
public-one's intimate relationships, bodily functions, embarrassing
habits. Nor was it truly spontaneous. Like the performative ideal of selfpresentation of the nineteenth century, the personality ideal involved a
certain amount of theatricality. Despite Mary Pickford's assurances, public
performance was still a self-conscious activity. One had to stage one's
natural emotions, to channel them into culturally recognized forms-to
appear warm and spontaneous in the ways that advertisers preached, and
as the movie stars did on the screen. Personality was very much a
consumer ideal, and at the height of the personality craze in the 1920s,
manufacturers paid stars to endorse products that allegedly produced
"personality." By selecting the right colors and styles of clothes, eating the
right foods and driving the right sort of car, one could express one's
individuality and find true fulfillment, celebrity endorsers claimed. In the
1920s, movie star Gladys Leslie promoted a beauty cream that allegedly
created "magnetic personality." "Thousands of women and girls are
actually wearing the wrong shade of face powder," said one actress in a
cosmetics advertisement. "They quench their personality, destroy what
ought to be their glamour and charm.""I9
With their ability to charismatically express their inner selves to an
audience of millions, motion picture actors became exemplars of the
personality ideal. Because of the cinema's extraordinary verisimilitude,
they appeared natural, authentic, and intimate on the screen, which made
them eminently fascinating figures in the new culture of self-exposure.
Screen actors appeared not to be acting, but merely 'performing' their real,
private selves in public.
The illusion that actors were the same on and off the screen was
encouraged by the Hollywood film studio publicity departments. 2 ° The
studios would make sure to cast the star consistently across roles and to
assure that all of her public appearances outside of her films, including
press interviews and advertising, attested to the transparency of the
cinematic fagade. A new empire of celebrity media-fan magazines,
syndicated gossip columns, and Hollywood stories in newspapers and
mass market magazines-assured readers that actors had naturally

118. SENNET, supra note 63, at 269.
119. Quoted in BARBAS, supra note 114, at 52. As early as 1915, movie stars were mobilized by
major corporations for product endorsements and advertisements. Consumer advertising "dovetailed
with the movies to offer a seamless tableau of fashions, hairstyles, favorite foods, personal habits...
many of which offered appealing alternatives to the stuffy residues of Victorianism," as one historian
has noted. EWEN, supra note 108, at 98.
120. See BARBAS, supra note 114; RICHARD DECORDOVA, PICTURE PERSONALITIES: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE STAR SYSTEM INAMERICA (2001).
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magnetic personalities that audiences should emulate to achieve success in
both public and private life. To this end, journalists claimed to allow
readers to "really know" the stars by exposing their "real selves." In
'exclusive' interviews, stars claimed to disclose the failures of their most
recent romances, their deepest aspirations, and their trivial bad habits. And
yet no matter how they sincerely they professed to reveal themselves, the
moral of the story was almost always the same. As a typical fan magazine
article from 1922 explained, "Norma Talmadge is very much like her
screen personality-warm and genuine." 121 The "wonderful fact" of
Blanche Sweet, one fan magazine wrote in 1915, was that she did not act;
audience
"instead, she lives through the stories with such fervor that the 122
believes that it is not witnessing the illusion of life but life itself."
As fan mail and sociological studies from this era illustrate, audiences
indeed saw actors as models of personal and social success, and they
copied their styles and "personalities" assiduously. "After one of [Mary]
Pickford's movies, I'd find myself walking up the aisle with that certain
little bent knee, toe turning in walk," one movie fan told a sociologist in
1931.123 "I went so far as to dress up like Pickford's character..and have
my picture taken." Pickford was blessed with charm, sincerity, and
"magnetic personality-that so called indescribable something-which
colors and vitalizes everything she does., 124 In a culture where star images
had become the "basic semiotic and symbolic raw material" from which
everyday citizens forged their own personal identities, the highest social
reward one could-achieve, in stark contrast to the Victorian ethos, was to
have one's image and personality appropriated by others. 25 When she
projected her personality freely to the world, when she allowed her photo
to circulate in films, publicity photos, and ads, the star invited the creative
transformation, reinterpretation, and resignification of the basic markers of
her identity.
Personality became not only the basis of film stardom, but all of modern
celebrity. As the New York Times noted in 1922, the definition of a star
was "one who only had to confine himself to one role-that of being
himself."' 126 In contrast to nineteenth-century fame, which was seen as a
reward for productive public achievements, modem celebrity rewarded not
doing, but being. By 1927, the celebrity pantheon, as reflected in the
121.
122.

Quoted in BARBAS, supra note 114, at 41.

123.

Id.at 46.

Id.

124. Id. at 47. See also ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN
MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE (1927) (discussing the influence of the movies on youth in the 1920s).

125. The meanings a star image comes to have, and hence the publicity values that attach to it, are
determined by what different groups and individuals with different needs and interests make of it, as
they use it to try and construct themselves and the world. Madow, supranote 90, at 195.
126. Actors andStars, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1920, X4.
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content of a typical issue of the Sunday New York Times, included
Broadway producers, literary figures, movie stars, society personalities,
sports players, the owners of baseball teams, screenwriters, and chefs,
among others.' 27 With the nineteenth-century American dream of social
mobility through hard work diminished by the early twentieth century, the
idea that one might be plucked from anonymity and made into a celebrity
by the mass media, one's face and image splayed across a billboard or
marquee because others have recognized the virtues of her unique inner
self, had become the equivalent of the nineteenth-century frontier, with its
28
promise of boundless opportunity for all. 1
Instant celebrity, however, also came in a less glamorous variety. In the
1920s, newspapers, tabloids, and newsreels teemed with attention-getting
stories about the involuntarily famous that played on the public's
fascination with mass exposure. Crime and accident witnesses, the
sufferers of rare diseases, lottery winners, and tragic victims were
routinely paraded before the public in dramatic stories announced with
screaming headlines. A survey of news content in the Philadelphia
Evening Bulletin in 1928 showed that the two most common kinds of
stories were crime and "human interest" stories. Many of the human
interest stories were "instant fame" stories dealing with accidents and what
editors called "freak" events ("Blind Storekeeper Saves Three Children at
Fire," "Youth Saves Two from Cliff.")'2 9
Warren and Brandeis had complained about "kodakers," newspaper
cameramen who snapped the pictures of random passers-by on the street.
As the Atlanta Constitution had lamented in 1902, "in this day of the
Kodak no man can hope to escape a snapshot, if his likeness is wanted for
any public use or private scheme of trade."' 3 ° What was then a novel
phenomenon had become by the 1920s fairly common. In cities, newsreel
and newspaper cameramen patrolled the streets in search of the titillating
and interesting, even if mundane. "No longer is it necessary to be
spectacular in order to face the camera," observed the New York Times in
1931. "Now the newsreel companies search out their material, and youth,
going for a stroll in the park, may suddenly find himself as part of a
human interest sequence called 'Under a Lovers' Moon."" 3
127. DE LEON, supra note 27, at 47.
128. In the new order, fame was not merely a reflection of hard work, but also luck. Modem
success stories, particularly the film celebrity success narratives, placed considerable emphasis on the
role of chance. Richard Dyer explains that the celebrity success myth tries to orchestrate several
contradictory elements: 1)ordinariness is the hallmark of the star; 2) the system rewards talent; 3)
lucky breaks are central to the career of the star; 4) hard work and professionalism are necessary for
stardom. RICHARD DYER, STARS 48 (1981).
129. NANCY MAVrrY, THE MODERN NEWSPAPER 36 (1930).
130.

The Right ofPrivacy,ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Nov. 10, 1902, at 4.

131.
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By the 1920s, modem America had become a culture of looking and the
gaze, where surface appearances assumed great social importance, and
where constant visual scrutiny was a reality of daily life. With this new
culture of self-exposure, the era of fifteen minutes of fame had arrived.
The possibility of being publicly exposed in the media was no longer
remote. Every person, no matter how exceptional or average, might have
his or her brief time in the spotlight by finding his way, through intent or
blunder, into the movies, the magazines, the papers.
C. The Law's Adaptation
The emerging tort law of privacy was integrally intertwined with these
cultural transformations. Between 1910 and 1920, the common law right
of privacy was recognized in two states, Kansas and Missouri, and in the
federal territory of Alaska. In the 1930s, five more states recognized the
right, bringing to fifteen the total number that permitted a cause of action
for invasion of privacy. 132 Despite the increased recognition of the privacy
right, plaintiffs rarely recovered. The culture of self-exposure had
transformed the social significance of privacy and the ways that judges
staked the boundaries of public and private life.
At a time when a burgeoning commercial modeling industry was taking
off, courts recognized that what plaintiffs often really wanted was the
economic value of their image, which was not recoverable under the right
of privacy. By 1930, the unwilling subjects of photographic
advertisements rarely based their claim for damages on embarrassment. In
1926, an eighteen year old housewife found her image on a poster for
flour; she sought $50,000 for use of her likeness without consent, not for
humiliation. 133 Most privacy suits in this period instead involved exposure
of names, photographs, and personal facts in films and news media, a
reflection of mass media's dependence on private life as a source of
material. The judicial resistance to these claims, operationalized in the
"newsworthiness," "public figure," and "involuntary public figure"
defenses, reflected the new cultural acceptance of the inevitability,
perhaps even desirability, of having one's personality exposed in public.
Part of the difficulty in winning a privacy lawsuit came from judges'
general unwillingness to label plaintiffs "private figures." In contrast to
the nineteenth century definition of public figures as politicians, inventors,
and other traditional "public men," the modern definition of public figure
132.
Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 61 (N.C. 1938) (North Carolina); Martin v.
F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (Cuyahoga County Ct. Corn. P1. 1938) (Ohio); Harlow v. Buno
Co., 36 Pa D.&C. 101 (C.P. Ct. Phila. County 1939) (Pennsylvania); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal App.285
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). See PEMBER, supra note 26, at 95.
133. George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification ofCelebrity: Personaas Property,51 LA. L. REv.
443,459 (1990).
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for the purposes of the privacy action reflected the redefinition of fame
and celebrity. By the 1930s, motion picture stars, singers, writers, athletes,
entrepreneurs, inventors, explorers, soldiers, and university professors,
among others, were considered by courts to be "public figures" who had
surrendered much of their right to privacy when they became famous. 34
'
Judges acknowledged the difficulty in drawing lines between public and
private figures in the era of instant celebrity-as a court asked in 1938,
"must a distinction be drawn between those in private life and those in
public office or public life, and if so, when does a person cease to be a
private citizen and become a public character?"-and when faced with
tough choices, tended to label plaintiffs public rather than private. 35
'
The courts never precisely defined how much of their privacy public
figures surrendered. There are virtually no reported appellate cases in this
period in which celebrities brought suit against papers for publishing
truthful gossip about their personal lives-probably because legal action
would attract further publicity to the embarrassing matter. In general,
Hollywood stars rarely brought claims of unwanted publicity because they
had contractually released their image and publicity rights to the agencies
36
and studios that managed them.'
The courts did suggest, however, that well-known celebrities,
particularly entertainment celebrities, had little in the way of legally
enforceable privacy. Because the very essence of their fame was their
ability to publicize their personalities, actors' private lives and photos
were a legitimately public matter. "Actresses and actors . . . . cannot
expect to lead quiet, secluded lives," announced an Ohio court in 1938,
declaring that "any person following the theatrical business for a life's
work has no such right or privacy."'' 37 In a case where Paramount Pictures
sued an Oklahoma printing company for publishing promotional materials
for theaters containing caricatured images of Paramount stars, on the
grounds that the printing company had invaded the stars' privacy, the
court affirmed the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating that "common
observation teaches us that the greatest asset to a star is constant

134. There was a good deal of "bootstrapping" going on here-the media turned private figures
into public figures by focusing attention on them. See Smolla, supra note 6, at 300.
135. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. (1938) at 55, 61.

136. The written seven-year studio contract not only gave the studio complete control over uses of
the star's image but generally forbade actors from engaging in any behavior, such as changing their
appearances or going out on dates without the studios' approval, that might reveal the falsity of the
screen persona. See GAINES, supra note 12, at 143-174.
137.
Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (Cuyahoga County Ct. Com. Pl. 1938). As

the Restatement (First)of Torts summarized, in return for his fame, the public figure "must... pay the
price of even unwelcome publicity through reports upon his private life and photographic
reproductions of himself and his family," unless defamatory. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF TORTS §867
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'
publicity."138
Actors could not claim a right of privacy, because their
'
"productions, faces and names are sold to the public."139
Courts also reassessed the relationship between volition and fame in the
personality culture. By the 1930s, courts recognized that popular media
routinely brought private citizens into the public eye with little effort on
their part whatsoever, and that there was often little correlation between
the public's interest in a person and his substantive accomplishments.
Because of the tenuous connection between intent and fame, it was now
public interest that determined whether one was a public figure.
The culture was coming to recognize that in the new media culture,
fame was a relational phenomenon, something not necessarily earned but
bestowed on a person by a fickle, often whimsical populace. The common
legal and social wisdom, a California court explained, was that a person
who "gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings is said to become
a public personage and thereby relinquishes a part of his right of
privacy.""14 In that case, a former professional boxer who went under the
name Canvasback Cohen had retired from the ring, but ten years later,
Groucho Marx mentioned his name in a radio broadcast, and Cohen sued
for invasion of privacy. The court held that no matter how much he wished
to retreat from the public eye, because he still piqued public interest, he
could not "draw himself like a snail into his shell" and retreat from public
view "at his will and whim. 14 1
Yet the courts felt the need to retain the fiction of "waiver" and
assumption of risk. In the Canvasback Cohen case, Cohen had "assumed
the risk" of lifelong publicity when he became a boxer, knowing that a
single appearance in popular culture potentially embedded him in the
popular imagination forever. The extreme version of this was the
involuntary public figure, the law's version of the "instant celebrity." The
involuntary public figure concept allowed the press in many cases to
escape liability for publicizing a private individual who had never overtly
sought publicity. The idea was that by virtue of living in a modern, massmediated society, everyone assumed the risk of media publicity whenever
they left the privacy of the home.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in the 1929 case Jones v. HeraldPost,142
became the first to recognize the "involuntary public figure" concept. In
Louisville, Mrs. Jones and her husband were walking on the street when
two men attacked him and stabbed him to death. The following day, a
story about the attack appeared in the local paper, accompanied by photos.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (W.D. Okla. 1938).
Id.
Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 705 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
Id.
18 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1929).

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 22:171

Mrs. Jones sued, stating that the photos were published without her
consent, and that since she was not a "public figure," having never sought
the spotlight, she had a right to live an unpublicized life. Yet the court
refused her plea for two thousand dollars damages. It stated that because
she went out on the street, she assumed the risk of publicity. Although the
court acknowledged the right to privacy, it explained that there were times
when "willingly or not," one became a participant in an event of public
concern. She then "emerged from... seclusion," and there was no legal
wrong when the press publicized her.'4 3
Similar reasoning guided the outcome in the 1939 case Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, involving a woman who had committed suicide by
jumping off a building in downtown Los Angeles. The Examiner
published a photo of it. The court observed that Mrs. Metter had waived
her right to privacy by virtue of committing suicide in a public place. She
"went to a public edifice in the heart of a large city and there ended her
life by plunging from a high building. It would be difficult to imagine a
more public method of self destruction. . . . Her own act brought this
about. It was her own act which waived any right to keep her picture from
public observation in connection with the news account of her suicide." 1"
Many cases in this period elaborated on this concept-that events and
people became "public" when they occurred outside the private home,
regardless of the facts disclosed or whether the subject had intended
publicity. In Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing Company,14 5 a
woman lawyer who had assisted the police sued Universal Film for using
newsreel footage of her in a police car. The court held that she had
assumed the risk of publicity when she involved herself in the case. In
Themo v. New EnglandNewspaper PublishingCo., the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that a plaintiff did not have a cause of action
for invasion of privacy when the Boston American published a photo of
him speaking outside with the police captain of Cambridge after he had
been robbed.'" In Thayer v. Worcester Post,the same court held that the
plaintiff did not state a claim for invasion of privacy when the paper
published a picture of the plaintiff at an "airport, which is presumably a
public place."' 47 Courts generally agreed that there was no invasion of
privacy when a newsreel or newspaper cameraman captured on film a

143. Id. at 974.
144. 35 Cal. App. 2d. 304, 312 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937). Metter's husband claimed that it had
invaded his right to privacy. The California Court of Appeals, which had a few years previously
recognized a right to privacy based on the state constitution, declared that there was no relational right
ofprivacy; the right to privacy died with the individual.
145. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 469,476 (1919).
146. 306 Mass. 54,58 (1940).
147. 284 Mass. 160, 163 (1933).
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passerby in a "parade or street scene."' 14 8
"One who is not a recluse," according to the Restatement (First) of
Torts, had a reasonable expectation of publicity in connection with "the
ordinary incidents of community life of which he is a part. These include
comment upon his conduct, the more or less casual observation of his
neighbors as to what he does upon his own land," in addition to the
possibility of being photographed as part of a street scene or group of
persons."14' 9 A North Carolina court summarized the modern wisdom
when it explained that in modern society "[p]eople do not live in
seclusion. When a person goes upon the street or highway or into any
other public place, he exhibits his features to public inspection."' 5 0
Through its frank embrace of the culture of fame, the realities of modern
visual surveillance, and the often irrational workings of the press and
popular tastes in the media age, privacy law affirmed the personality
culture and the impossibility of privacy in public.
PART II
A. Privacyand the News
The idea underlying the media's prerogative to publish the photos and
private facts of both "voluntary" and "involuntary" public figures was that
their activities were "newsworthy." The newsworthiness defense or
privilege, which developed simultaneously in this period, immunized
media defendants from invasion of privacy claims if a court found the
publicized material to be "newsworthy," or a "matter of public concern" or
of "public interest." Again, in a distinct change from the earlier era, the
focus of courts' inquiry in this period was less on the intimate nature of
the facts disclosed than the public's interest in those facts. Through the
newsworthiness concept, judges defined an expansive domain of public
knowledge and discourse that included personal information. They
validated the broad scope of human interest journalism and a press that

148. 306 Mass. 54, 58 (1940). A rare case that came out the other way, Blumenthal v. Picture
Classics, involved an immigrant widow who was shown in a newsreel vending bread and rolls on the
street. 257 N.Y.S. 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932). The newsreel was part of a series of live scenes ofNew
York City, titled "Sightseeing with Nick and Tony," advertised as "a series of faithful photographing
of public views in and about such sections and quarters and a record of the scenes and events without
exaggeration or ridicule." A New York appellate court, over a vigorous dissent, approved the motion
for temporary injunction, holding that the newsreel depiction did constitute an invasion of privacy
because Blumenthal was not merely photographed as part of a crowd, but "singled out because of
merely being on the scene." The dissent suggested that the woman, by virtue of her street-vending
occupation, opened herself up to the possibility of publicity and could not complain when she was
depicted in an undistorted manner for the purposes ofdisseminating news or current information.
149. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §867 cmt. c (1939).
150. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 63 (N.C. 1938).
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published according to mass tastes.
Beginning in the 1920s and 30s, courts began to articulate a concept of
"newsworthy material" that was defined in terms of the existing content of
popular news media. In making the newsworthiness determination, courts
often conflated material of public interest -that interests the public- and
in the public interest -that serves the public good-so that public curiosity
came to define "matters of public interest," which was then equated with
newsworthiness. 5' If something appeared in a popular publication, courts
assumed that it generated public interest and was therefore newsworthy.
This approach to newsworthiness has been criticized as superficially
descriptive and unduly deferential to the press. Not surprisingly, few
privacy plaintiffs could succeed when newsworthiness came to be defined
as "anything that appears in the press."152
Yet I argue that, particularly given the context of social debates over
mass media at the time, newsworthiness was not merely a mechanically
descriptive term--it had a normative valence as well. Judges confronted
with the newsworthiness question deferred to the media, in part, because
they seemed to acknowledge the relativity of taste and the impropriety of
courts making aesthetic judgments about culture. Given the existence of
morals regulations on mass media at the time-motion picture censorship,
for example, was practiced in several states-this was not an insignificant
development.' 53 Applying emerging interpretations of constitutional
freedom of speech to the common law privacy context, courts suggested
that a press that followed public demands and curiosities was important to
a functioning modern society not only because it disseminated useful and
entertaining information, but because it sparked connection and
conversation between people. The essence of valuable news was that it
"invite[d] public comment," as a New York court suggested in a 1931
media privacy case." Because of its ability to spark public interest and
discussion, the popular press was "bound up with fundamental democratic
institutions.' ' 5 5
The judicial development of newsworthiness was part of the larger
cultural conversation in the interwar period about the role of mass
communications in modern society. From that historic national discussion
151. Thomas Emerson, The Right of Privacyand Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 342 (1979) ("Anything that is published is by definition newsworthy and a matter of public
interest."); see also Glasser & Dennis, supranote 8.
152. comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of
Newsworthiness, U. CHI. L. REV. 722, 725 (1963) ("[lfnewsworthy is simply a descriptive term, then
the newsworthiness privilege has engulfed the tort of invasion of privacy.").
153. On film censorship, see LAURA WITTERN-KELLER, FREEDOM OF THE SCREEN: LEGAL
CHALLENGES TO STATE FILM CENSORSHIP (2008).
154. Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, 139 Misc. 290,292 (N.Y. App. Div. 1931).
155. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 Misc. 776, 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
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emerged a cultural awareness, even consensus that the people have a
"right to know"-and the press a duty to furnish-a vast array of
information on a variety of subjects, including at times personal or private
affairs.' 56 This obligation of the media to provide expansive news
stemmed not only from the people's need for facts but from the media's
social functions-its power to generate public discourse and to facilitate
the essential, common social bonds that created the public itself.
In what follows I very briefly describe four different conversations on
the subjects of press freedom, the boundaries of public knowledge, and the
social uses of the news that took place in the 1920s and 30s, conversations
that informed the development of the newsworthiness concept. Newspaper
publishers justified the publication of private facts by promoting the idea
of newspapers as public servants who catered to the public's interests and
curiosities. Academic sociologists argued that the popular press, by
sparking dialogue and conversation on a broad variety of topics of interest
to the public, could reinvigorate democracy and community in America.
This discourse theory of the news, and an expansive definition of "matters
of public concern," were similarly taken up by the Supreme Court in its
developing First Amendment doctrine.
1. The Pressand the Public Interest
The continued rise of sensationalist and celebrity journalism in the
1920s and 30s led to further libel suits brought against newspaper
publishers and ongoing attacks on the press by social reformers. States and
municipalities strengthened libel, obscenity, and contempt laws and
proposed veracity and disclosure laws that would prohibit anonymous
editorials or willful misrepresentations of the truth.' 57 To defend
themselves against criticism that the news had become salacious and
trivial, leading publishers embarked on a project of self-justification, selfregulation and professionalization that involved the creation of journalism
schools and industry trade associations and professional codes. 5
Publishers portrayed their publications as devoted to the public interest.' 59
As Joseph Pulitzer had famously stated, "The press ... makes the public
6
interest its own."'
Between the two world wars, human interest stories and news-as-

156. As Thomas Emerson later summarized it, the right to know concept includes "two closely
related features: First, the right to read, to listen, to see, and to otherwise receive communications; and
second, the right to obtain information as a basis of transmitting ideas or facts to others." Thomas 1.
Emerson, Legal Foundationsofthe Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,2.
157. See LAWSON, supranote 45; ROSENBERG, supranote 41.
158. TEEL, supra note 33, at 117.
159. BENT, supra note 28, at 179.
160. TEEL, supra note 33, at 47.
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entertainment had come to define modem mass-market journalism. 6 '
Publishers defended the focus on gossip and entertainment by claiming it
to be in the "public interest." As one newspaper manual from 1930
proclaimed, the motto of the modern newspaper was to "give the public
what it wants."' 16 2 Anything immoral or sensationalistic was to be blamed
for the general public
on the public, since the "paper never prints anything
'' 63
that is worse than what the general public wants."
This rationale was often used by editors and publishers to legitimate
newspaper invasions of privacy. Even though the American Society of
Newspaper Editors' code of ethics stated that "a newspaper should not
invade private rights or feelings without sure warrant of public right as
distinguished from public curiosity," in practice, "right" and "curiosity"
were often conflated. Newspaper invasions of privacy were not the fault
of editors and reporters, but "the circumstances which have made the
private affairs of certain persons a matter of public interest, and the
insistence of the public that its interest be satisfied," a newspaper manual
explained."6 In cases where a reporter was forced to invade the privacy of
an unwilling subject, the "best thing the reporter can do is to meet (the
subject's) resentment by leading them to face the fact that what they have
165
done is already news, and that neither he nor they can change that fact.
The relentless hounding of aviator Charles Lindbergh, who was so
averse to publicity that he moved to England to escape the American
press, sparked a national outcry. 166 Yet even some leading publishers
defended the press conduct, arguing that the press had no duty to
Lindbergh, only to the curiosities of the American people. 167 One
publisher summarized the modern professional wisdom when he explained
that "the only way to change the character of our newspapers is to change
the character of the public." '68 What was newsworthy, and in the public's
interest, was whatever the public wanted to read.
161. As sociologist Helen McGill Hughes summarized in 1940: "The natural history of the
newspaper ... is the story of the expansion of the traditional function--originally the publishing of
practical, important news-to include the sale of interesting personal gossip. In the long process of
discovering and exploiting human interest the press ... became rich and powerful." HUGHES, supra
note 29, at 35.
162. MAVITY,supra note 129, at 15.
163. TED CURTIS SMYTHE, THE GILDED AGE PRESS, 1865-1900, at 165 (2003) (quoting a
contemporary journalist). Attacking an Illinois law prohibiting newspapers from publishing "gruesome
details," a local paper explained that "[tihe fault is not in the newspapers, it is in the people....
Newspapers are blamed for giving the people what they want." KILLING THE MESSENGER 19 (Tom
Goldstein ed., rev. ed. 2007) (quoting the 1911 editorial ofjournalist William Allen White).
164. MAVITY, supranote 129, at 75.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 74-5.
167. Id at 75; see also Editorial, Press Sees Nation "Shamed" In Lindbergh Exile, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 1935.
168. Id. at 17.
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2. A Cravingfor the News
Were journalists giving the public what it wanted? It is impossible to
know. Journalists do not merely follow public interests but shape the
interests of the public. It is clear, however, that much of the reading public
had become dependent on mass media for information and entertainment,
and felt entitled to the news.
Consumers were upset when they did not get the news or the news they
wanted. As one editor noted, when newspapers were inadvertently
published without popular features, such as gossip columns and the
comics, the telephones at the newspaper office were deluged with
inquiries.' 69 Columbia University sociologist Bernard Berelson
interviewed New Yorkers during a 1945 newspaper strike. Several
interviewees were angry about missing news of national and world affairs,
which kept them "informed." Some craved the details they used to
structure their daily activities, such as radio and movie schedules and
advertisements. Others longed for newspapers' entertainment features crossword puzzles, human interest stories, and celebrity news-and the
"escape" that reading the newspaper provided.
Readers missed not only the informational and entertainment aspects of
the news but its social functions. Newspapers gave people "something to
talk about," study participants reiterated, and when the papers were
missing, they had nothing to say to the neighbors. "You have to read in
order to keep up a conversation with other people," one subject noted. 7 0
As historian Lawrence Levine has demonstrated, consumers saw mass
media and mass culture, which Levine likened to the "folklore of
industrial society, ' '1. 1 as the basis of intimate social bonds. Neighbors and
strangers came together daily to discuss and critique radio broadcasts and
news articles. 17 2 Mass media also created a sense of national identity. In a
period when immigrants and their second-generation children were
forging new American identities, mass media and mass culture,
disseminating shared values and symbols, transformed cultural outsiders
into cultural insiders, and all Americans into consumers.173 Mass media
also created "imagined communities," to use Benedict Anderson's term,

169. Raymond Clapper, A Free Press Needs DiscriminatingPublic Criticism, in FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS TODAY, 83, 89-90 (Harold Ickes ed., 1941).
170. Bernard Berelson, What Missing the Newspaper Means, in COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH
1948-49, at 111 (Paul Lazarsfeld & Frank Stanton eds., 1949).
171. LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, THE UNPREDICTABLE PAST 291 (1993).
172. For historical studies of audience reception, see RICHARD BUTSCH, THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN AUDIENCES: FROM STAGE TO TELEVISION, 1750-1990 (2000); and KATHRYN FULLERSEELEY, HOLLYWOOD IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD: HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES OF LOCAL MOVIEGOING
(2008). On newspaper reading, see LEONARD, supranote 37.
173. See, e.g., L[ZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO,

1919-1939 (1991).

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 22:171

through common practices of consumption. 7 4 Americans embraced mass
media in this period in the sense that they consumed it avidly and
incorporated it into all aspects of their daily lives. In various ways, they
acknowledged that mass communications had become the connective
tissue linking diverse social groups together under a common public
identity.
3. News as Conversation
The "give the public what it wants" rationale-and the public
enthusiasm for the news and facts of all types-was one justification for
an expansive definition of newsworthiness. Yet the outline of another,
more substantive justification for broad media content was being
developed in the emerging academic field of communications studies,
which developed within sociology departments in the early twentieth
century. The field had grown from sociologists' awareness of the central
role of mass communications in modern society-as George Herbert
Mead had observed, society is a series of social acts, and a social act is a
communicative process.' At the turn of the century, sociologists had
begun to observe the dependence of the public on the news media as a
source of knowledge. "The great majority of people depend on
[newspapers] for most of their information-the raw material of opinionand for nearly all their ideas."' 76 In the period between 1920 and 1940, the
study of communication became a discipline in its own right.' 77
The academic debate over the role of mass communications in modern
life was marked by "significant doubts" and "significant hopes," according
to one historian. 7 ' A well-known, pessimistic perspective was expressed
by Walter Lippmann, who in his influential Public Opinion (1922) argued
that newspapers fed the public a distorted view of the world, which
produced a dangerously skewed public opinion. Lippmann's views had
been shaped by his observations of the propagandistic manipulation of the
press by the government during World War 1, and by the increasingly
common use of public relations professionals by major institutions to
mediate their relations with the press. Lippmann argued that only official
news bureaus staffed by experts could produce unbiased news and thereby
174.

See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND

SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991). Anderson emphasizes the role of the newspaper as the center of a
mass ceremony in which a community coheres both in the text and in the act of reading.
175. SUSMAN,supra note 13, at 258.
176. Delos Wilcox, The American Newspaper: A Study in SocialPsychology, 16 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SI. 56 (1900); see also V.S. Yarros, The Press and Public Opinion, 5 AM. J. SOc.
372 (1899).
177. On the development of the field of communication studies, see DANIEL CZITROM, MEDIA
AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1983); SUSMAN, supra note 13, at 259.
178. SUSMAN, supra note 13, at258.
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objective public opinion. The manufacture of consent by political elites
working through the press was both a crisis of democracy and a crisis of
journalism. 7 9
There is no doubt a pessimistic strain that runs through academic studies
of mass communications in this period. There were attacks on the biases
and inaccuracies of the news media, its concentration in the hands of a few
powerful publishers, its focus on entertainment values, and its potential for
propagandist uses as a channel of "mass persuasion."' 8 0 Yet some
commentators and theorists, though nonetheless critical, had faith in the
inherent possibilities of mass media to invigorate democracy and
participatory social life. While Lippmann's model of the news was
informational- for Lippmann, the duty of the press was to give to the
public accurate representations of the world-others had a view of the
news that was conversational: the purpose of news was not "to represent
and inform but to signal, tell a story, and activate inquiry," to stimulate
"conversation and discussion."''
This discourse model valued the news for its participatory dimension,
which was an essential aspect of democracy. Public opinion, the
foundation of the modem state and the basis of political action,' 82 emerged
from "discussions of individuals attempting to formulate and rationalize
their individual interpretations of the news," according to Park.'83 As
sociologist Carroll Clark wrote in 1933, the modem public was "organized
on the basis of a universe of discourse.""' By providing the public with
shared experiences, common stimuli, and unified frames of reference,
mass media allowed it to "carry on the conversation of our culture.18
4. News and the Constitution
The conversational model of the news also lay at the heart of the
emerging constitutional free speech doctrine of this period. Although the
United States has long had a commitment to freedom of speech and press,
and to the broad dissemination of information to the public, until the
179. Walter Lippmann, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS (1920). On Lippmann's influence on the
Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, see Robert Cover, The Left, the Right and the First
Amendment, 40 MD. L. REV. 349 (1981).
179. FELDMAN, supra note 22, at 396.
180.

See DAN SCHILLER, THEORIZING COMMUNICATION: A HISTORY 41 (1996).

181. JAMES CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE 62 (1989).
182. Robert Park, News as a Form of Knowledge, 45 AM. J. SOC. 669, 686 (1940) ("Ours, it
seems, is an age of the news, and one of the most important events in American civilization has been
the rise of the reporter.").
183. Robert Park, News and the Power of the Press, 2 AM. J. SOC. (1941). "The power of the
press is the influence that newspapers exercise in the formation of public opinion and in mobilizing the
community for political action."
184. Carroll Clark, The Conceptofthe Public, 13 SW. SOC. SCt. Q. 311-20 (1933).
185. Carey, supranote 181, at 67.
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twentieth century, the Supreme Court's general stance on free expression
was that although prior restraints were proscribed, subsequent punishment
of speech that had a "bad tendency," that threatened public safety or
morals, was a legitimate exercise of the state's police powers. 8 6 At the
turn of the twentieth century, this doctrine was beginning to be challenged
by those who argued that there were constitutional limitations on7
governmental power to impose post-publication sanctions on speech.1
Theorists had begun to argue that the First Amendment protected the
social interest in free speech, which was "ample freedom of discussion" of
"public affairs" or "matters of public concern."' 88 This insight was first
expressed at the Supreme Court level in two well-known opinions, one
concurring and one dissenting, in cases during the World War I era
challenging criminal convictions for seditious speech brought under the
Espionage and Sedition Act. In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in
his dissent in Abrams v. United States, had described the democratic and
social virtues of discussion, linking his famous "market[place] of ideas" to
free and open public discourse. 89 In his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California (1927), Justice Louis Brandeis had also identified the core
interest protected by the First Amendment as public discussion, which he
linked to the search for truth and democratic self-governance. Public
discussion was a "political duty" and a procedural prerequisite of any
democratic society that was essential to stable government. 190
During the 1930s and 40s, as the Supreme Court struck down the bad
tendency test and instituted more speech-protective interpretations of the
First Amendment, society's freedom to discuss public matters crystallized
as the core of constitutional free speech protection. In case after case, the
Court linked free expression to open discussion, participatory democracy,
and democratic government. In a social environment characterized by the
rise of organized labor, developing sociological theories of intergroup
relations, and Roosevelt's efforts to court a broad and inclusive electorate,
freedom of speech and "freedom of discussion" symbolized the Court's
embrace of the emerging model of pluralist democracy-the notion of a
diverse people who shared a cultural commitment to govern themselves
through democratic processes characterized by fair bargaining. 191
While never specifically defining "matters of public concern," the Court
186. See FELDMAN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 22; GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE
SPEECH, supra note 22.
187. These are summarized in RABBAN, supranote 46.
188. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 509 (1904).
189. 250U.S.616,630.
190. 274 U.S. 357, 375. After 1925, when the Gidow v. New York case made the First
Amendment, through the Fourteenth, binding on states, state laws, such as the syndicalism law at issue
in Whitney, were constitutionally challenged before the Court.
191. FELDMAN, supranote 22, at 332-33.
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suggested that these extended broadly, beyond material strictly related to
politics and government. In the 1941 case Thornhill v. Alabama, which
affirmed labor unions' right to picket peacefully as an exercise of free
speech, the Court declared that the First Amendment guaranteed the public
discussion, "without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment,"
of all "matters of public concern," which it defined as "all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
' In later cases, the
society to cope with the exigencies of their period."192
Court spoke of the duty of the press to ensure the public a "flow of news"
presented from a variety of viewpoints. 193 As the Court stated in the 1937
case of Grosjean v. American Press, in which it struck down a state
license tax imposed only on periodicals with a certain minimum
circulation, the First Amendment protected "not the censorship of the
press merely," but any restriction that would impede its ability to provide
information that would facilitate "free and general discussion
absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of
their rights as citizens."' 94
B. What is newsworthy?
It was in this context that the "newsworthiness" privilege, the modem
version of Warren and Brandeis' qualified privilege for "comment and
criticism on matters of public and general interest," was developed in the
public disclosure cases of the interwar period. The judicial interpretation
of newsworthiness-with few limitations, whatever truthful information
satisfied readers' interests-was developed primarily in cases brought
under the New York statute that was enacted after the Roberson case. The
law was often described as a privacy statute, although it dealt with
invasions of privacy in the broadest sense-the publication of
photographs, facts, and stories about people who objected to publication
on the grounds that it presented them to the public in a way that was
undignified or humiliating. It banned unauthorized use of names, private
facts, and personal images for "trade."' 95
The statute defined news as the antithesis of trade or advertising. The
distinction drew on the traditional division in constitutional law between
public and private speech; news was thought to have a public quality
whereas advertising served private interests. Courts, however, often
conflated private, in the sense of intimate, with so-called "private" trade
purposes. The distinction was made even murkier by the fact that
192.
193.
194.
195.

310U.S.88, 101-02.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945).
297 U.S. 233, 249-50.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS L. §50.
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newspapers are commercial. Courts had to negotiate what Rochelle
Gurstein aptly describes as the "new and ambiguous area between
commercial exploitation of personality and the legitimate reporting of the
news."'

196

Judges sometimes made the news-trade distinction by asking whether
the material was factual or fictional. The more a particular publication
verged on being untruthful, the more likely it was not "news"-that it was
published for commercial purposes rather than the public purpose of
"disseminating information." However, recognizing the blurring of news
and entertainment in even the most respectable news outlets, courts rarely
found material in newspapers to be entirely fictional. 97 A publication
containing false or exaggerated elements was only considered to be an
actionable 'trade' publication when it rose to the level of complete
fictionalization, as in a 1913 case in which the New York Herald
published a first-person piece about 'adventures in an African Forest,'
which it falsely attributed to a "Baron d'Altomonte." D'Altomonte sued,
and the court held that the use of the his name to sell the article was a
usage "for the purposes of trade." 198
Assuming that the market accurately reflected the value of publications
to the consumers who read and used them, judges generally regarded news
content as a reflection of popular values and interests. A publisher, with
196. Gurstein, supra note 48, at 169.
197. In a case that nicely summarizes the courts' general embrace of human interest journalism,
the plaintiff Molony, a seventeen-year-old pharmacists' mate in the Coast Guard, had been acclaimed
as a hero for his activities in aiding the victims of a plane which crashed against the Empire State
Building. His doings were praised in all the major newspapers and in newsreels and magazines
throughout the country. Six months later, cartoons depicting his heroism had been published in a
magazine called Boy Comics. Molony sued for an invasion of privacy under a New York statute. The
lower court, finding for Molony, explained that the comics of his exploits were actionable; they were
not news because they were printed primarily for profit. Molony v. Boy Comics, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 173,
174 (1946).
But the appeals court reversed the decision on the grounds that the cartoons were in fact
newsworthy and that the lower court had used an incorrect definition. It did not matter that the
cartoons were entertaining or that they were not "educational." They were factually correct, their
primary purpose was to inform, and most important, they dealt with a matter that interested the public.
In order to escape the statutory ban, "a factual presentation need not be educational, even if it does not
pertain strictly to current news. Such subjects as cartoons, Believe-it-or-Not Ripley, gossip and social
columns are not chiefly educative in character, yet if about persons in the limelight, they are not likely
to be actionable if the facts are true and if the comment fair." Molony v. Boy Comics, 277 A.D. 166,
170-1 (1950).
198. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 457 (N.Y. 1913). The dominant
approach to the news-trade distinction can be seen in an early case, Jeffries v. New York Evening
JournalPubl'g Co, 124 N.Y.S. 780 (1910). In that case, prizefighter Jim Jeffries had written an
autobiography which was on sale in bookstores throughout New York. At about the same time, the
Evening Journalbegan to publish a serialized biography of him. He sought to restrain publication of
the biography and claimed twenty five thousand dollars in damages. Jeffries claimed that the use of his
picture in the publication was an invasion of privacy and that it was intended to increase circulation
and therefore was 'trade.' The court held that because it had been published in a feature article in a
newspaper, the serialized biography was not intended for the purposes of trade but rather
"dissemination of information," and that no invasion of privacy had occurred.
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the "interest of the public in view," would not publish any news if
"interest in the item has died out." 199 Public interest was the essence of
newsworthiness, and if an item appeared in a publication that called itself
a newspaper, it presumably engaged public interests, no matter how banal
it might have seemed to the judges. In a 1913 case, the Police Gazette, a
lurid tabloid, published a photograph of the plaintiff, a young female
professional entertainer. The court acknowledged that the Police Gazette
was not respectable-it published "a very considerable amount of reading
matter that scarcely appeals to a refined mind"-but that material was
nonetheless newsworthy. The court observed that a contrary position
would make almost every newspaper and magazine story actionable under
the statute.2z°
Newsworthy material was not limited to newspapers-it could also
appear in newsreels, magazines, and books. In 1936, when a woman who
was part of an exercise course for overweight women sued a newsreel
company for using her unauthorized image, the court dismissed the
complaint, stating that it was within the boundaries of the public interest
as long as women continued to worry about their weight.20 ' When an
infamous strikebreaker sued the publisher of a book about his criminal
activities for invading his privacy, the court dismissed the claim, stating
that the matter was newsworthy because the subject was one of great
public interest even though it did not appear in a periodical. Because it
concerned an important subject matter that created a public "reaction," it
was "news." 20 2 In an Alabama case, Smith v. Doss, a court held that events
"newsworthy" if they
that occurred decades earlier could remain
20 3
continued to pique "legitimate public interest.
Through this "public interest" standard, gossip columns formally
achieved the legal status of "news." In the 1936 case Middleton v. News
Syndicate Co., the name and picture of the plaintiff, an unemployed model
working as a cigarette girl in a hotel, appeared in a newspaper column
titled The Inquiring Photographer. Because it appeared in a regular
199. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 469,476 (1919).
200. Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publ'g Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 299 (1914).
201. Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1936). "While it may be difficult in
some instances to find the point at which the public interest ends, it seems reasonably clear that

pictures of a group of corpulent women attempting to reduce with the aid of some rather novel and
unique apparatus do not cross the borderline, at least so long as a large proportion of the female sex
continues its concern about any increase in poundage." Id at 747.
202.

Kline v. Robert McBride& Co, 11 N.Y.S.2d 674, 680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).

203. 370 So. 2d 118, 121 (La. Ct. App. 1948). Entertainment and sports stars since retired from
the spotlight remained newsworthy "public figures" for potentially the duration of their lives. Cohen
v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 705 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949). This was also the case with former
criminals. In Bernstein v. NationalBroad.Co., a federal district court held that a broadcast of a former
criminal twelve years after his release did not invade his right to privacy, since "persons formerly
public ... cannot be protected against disclosure and re-disclosure of known facts," so long as they
aroused "general interest." 129 F. Supp. 817, 828 (D.D.C. 1955).
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column of a major New York newspaper, the court concluded that it was
an item of human interest, and therefore legitimate news.2 ° In a D.C. case,
Elmhurst v. Pearson,20 5 the notorious political columnist Drew Pearson
was sued for invasion of privacy by a man who was a defendant in a
sedition case. Pearson, in his weekly radio broadcast, had gossiped that
Elmhurst was employed as a hotel waiter so that he would be in a position
to overhear conversations carried on by high officials. Elmhurst's
complaint was dismissed as a matter of law, since it dealt with a matter of
"legitimate public interest." As the Restatement of Torts summarized,
publishers had a 'privilege' to satisfy the20"curiosity
of the public as to
6
their leaders, heroes, villains, and victims.
The most substantive justification for the public interest/public curiosity
standard appeared in the New York trial court case of Sarat Lahiri v. New
York Daily Mirror, where a performer of "a feat known as the 'Hindu
Rope Trick"' sued the New York Mirror when it published his picture
alongside a feature article about a British society sponsoring a contest for
the performance of rope tricks.2 °7 He had neither been involved with the
contest nor endorsed it. The New York Supreme Court said that the
picture was not published solely for the purposes of promoting sales,
citing its "legitimate relation" to the article, 2 8 which was newsworthy
because it addressed public curiosities. The court defined the scope of
newsworthiness as encompassing articles or photographs that were
"neither strictly news items nor strictly fictional in character."20 9 Such
articles included "travel stories, stories of distant places, the reproduction
of items of past news, and surveys of social conditions. ,210 It did not
matter whether they appeared "in the news columns, the educational
section, or the magazine section. It is the article itself rather than its
location that is the determining factor. 211
Sarat Lahiri was one of the first public disclosure cases to imply that
there may be constitutional limitations on punishment for the publication
of truthful material on matters of public concern. A right of privacy that
covered "news items and articles of general public interest, educational
and informative in character," implicated the rights of a "free press."2" 2 In
another New York case, the court noted that to impose liability for
disclosure of private facts in a book would be to abridge the freedom of
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

295 N.Y.S. 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
153 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §867 cmnt. c (1939).
Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
Id. at 782.
Id.

210.

Id.

211. Id. at 776, 777.
212. Id. at782.
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the press.213 A free press is "so intimately bound up with fundamental
democratic institutions that if the right of privacy is to be extended to
cover news items and articles of general public interest... it should be the
result of a clear expression of legislative policy," the court concluded in
Sarat Lahiri.214 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts similarly
2 15
spoke of a "right" of the public and the press to "discuss personalities.,
It was in this context that the Second Circuit decided the famous 1941
case of Sidis v. F-R Publishing,which affirmed the broad newsworthiness
standard.2 16 Sidis marked the first time a federal appellate court had ruled
on a privacy case involving the public disclosure of private facts, and the
impact of the decision was felt widely-in legal circles, in the publishing
industry, and in popular culture. 217 William James Sidis was perhaps the
most notorious child prodigy of the early twentieth century. He had taught
math at Harvard at 11, graduated at 16, became a brilliant student at
Harvard Law School, taught at a university, and then gave it all up for a
life as a recluse. In 1937, when the New Yorker published a "where are
they now" article on him, Sidis was a 39-year old eccentric who actively
shied away from any kind of human contact.218 The article described in
searching detail his life in a shabby one-room apartment and his odd
habits, including his obsession with streetcar transfers and an obscure
Indian tribe.2 9 Sidis had spoken freely with a female interviewer from the
magazine but later claimed not to have known what the purpose of the
interview was. 220
Sidis sued the New Yorker in federal court on two counts of invasion of
privacy, one under the New York privacy statute and one under the
common law. He alleged that the articles exposed him to "unwarranted
and undesired publicity" that held him up to "scorn and ridicule" and
caused him severe anguish and loss of reputation. 22 ' The District Court
for the Southern District of New York dismissed both privacy counts, and

213.
214.

People v. Robert McBride Co., 159 Misc. 5, 11 (City Magis. Ct. ofN.Y. 1936).
Lahiri, 162 Misc., at 783. Another New York court spoke of gossip about even private

individuals - "private social affairs and prevailing fashions involving individuals who make no bid for
publicity" - as "public property," "where the apparent use is to convey information of interest and not
mere advertising." Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, 139 Misc. 290, 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931),
rev'd, 237 A.D. 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932).
215. Themo v. New England Newspaper Publ'g Co., 306 Mass. 54, 55 (Mass. 1940).
216. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
217. See, e.g., Sidis, A "Wonder" in Boyhood Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1944, at 21; Former
Child Prodigy Fails in Pushing Suit on Magazine, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1940, at 11;Prodigy's
Progress,WASH. POST, July 23, 1944, B4; BurnedOut Prodigy,NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1944, at 77.
218. Jared Manley, Where Are They Now? April Fool, NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1937, at 22; Sidis,

807.
219. Id.
220. See Emile Karafiol, The Right to Privacy and the Sidis Case, 12 GA. L. REV. 513, 519
(1978).
221. 34 F. Supp, 19, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
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on appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The appeals court
admitted that the article was "merciless in its dissection" of the details of
Sidis' private life.222 However, Sidis' privacy had not been invaded.
Sidis had no right of privacy in this context because he was a public
figure, having voluntarily put himself in the spotlight and having remained
there by virtue of the public's continued interest in him. "As a child
prodigy, he excited both admiration and curiosity.... In 1910 he was a
person about whom the newspapers might display a legitimate intellectual
interest," Judge Clark explained.223 The press attention to Sidis during his
childhood made him a public figure then. But was he a public figure now?
Even though years had passed since his heyday, like the former boxer
Canvasback Cohen in Cohen v. California,Sidis could not "withdraw into
his shell. '224 Even though "Sidis today is neither politician, public
administrator, nor statesman," Judge Clark said, Sidis had retained the
"questionable and indefinable status of public figure" because the public
was still "curious about whether or not he had fulfilled his early
promise. '' 22' The only evidence that the court had of people's curiosity,
however, was the fact that the article appeared in the New Yorker, a
widely-circulated publication. The court concluded that the "limited
scrutiny of the private life of one who has attained, voluntarily or
involuntarily, the status of public figure" would not constitute an invasion
226
of privacy.
Moreover, because the article was "amusing and instructive" and
truthful, the court suggested, it was newsworthy. 227 The subject was of
"considerable popular news interest" and a matter of public
"discussion." 228 The Second Circuit did not rule on the question of
whether newsworthiness would always constitute a complete defense. It
did, however, acknowledge the offensiveness exception described in the
Restatement- that in some cases, "revelations may be so intimate and so
unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notions of decency. '229 "Decency," however, in the Sidis
court's equation, was to be defined by the limits of public curiosity.
"Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and public

222. Sidis, at 809.
223. Id. Indeed, the press had shown great interest in him during his years as a child prodigy; a
search of the New York Times in that era reveals numerous mentions of Sidis, including his early
psychological problems. See, e.g., Fear is Felt for Sidis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1910, at 1;Farmer a
Rival to HarvardProdigy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1910, at 20.
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figures" were subjects of interest to the public, "and when such are the
mores of the community it would be unwise for a court to bar their
expression in the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day.- 230 The
court described this as a matter of common wisdom: "everyone will agree
that at some point the public interest in obtaining information becomes
dominant over the individual's desire for privacy. ' 231 Originally
envisioned as a means to curb the excesses of the new journalism, by the
time of Sidis, privacy cases had become vehicles through which judges
affirmed the social worth of public curiosity and the right of the press to
fulfill it, whether mundane, banal, or intrusive.
CONCLUSION

By the time of Sidis, fifteen states recognized the public disclosure
action.232 However, as lawyer Louis Nizer acknowledged that year,
recovery had become virtually impossible because few plaintiffs could
surmount the hurdle of newsworthiness. 233 The broad newsworthiness
standard and the involuntary public figure or "instant celebrity" concept
continued to define the outcome of public disclosure cases in the postWorld War II period. In making judgments about newsworthiness, courts
admitted that it was impossible to know whether editorial staffs were
responsible for press content or whether newspapers were merely catering
to the "present mores of the people." Because of this, a federal district
court stated, it was simply more expedient for judges to assume the
latter.234 With the advent of television and the need for unifying national
symbols in the suburbanizing, geographically dispersed postwar society,
celebrity culture expanded into all realms of American life, including
politics. Courts repeatedly held that scandal magazines and television
programs could not be punished for disclosures of private facts about
celebrities unless they were false; their widespread consumption
was
"mute testimony" that the public was obsessed with gossip. 235
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,a case involving a claim of "false light" invasion of
privacy brought under the New York privacy statute, the Supreme Court
for the first time in 1967 offered its perspective on the developments this
230.

Id.

231. Id.
232. California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Alaska, at common law; D.C., New York, and Utah by
statute. See PEMBER, supra note 26, at 264-66.
233. See Nizer, supra note 59, at 542.
234. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Minn. 1948).
235. Goelet v. Confidential, Inc., 5 App. Div.2d 226, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958). Television news
coverage produced many instant celebrities, whose public disclosure claims were generally rejected.
As long as they were "present at a scene where news was in the making," they were, for the purposes
of the law, involuntary public figures. Jacova v. S. Radio Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34,40 (Fla. 1955).
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paper has described: the divergence between fame and volition, the social
and legal status of the "involuntary public figure," and the relationship of
the news media, "matters of public concern," public discourse, and core
protected speech under the First Amendment. In that case, the Court
overturned the decision of the New York Court of Appeals upholding a
jury award for the magazine's invasion of the Hill family's privacy under
the New York privacy statute."' Hill and his family had been held hostage
in their home by escaped convicts, and the ordeal was made into a play
that was highly fictionalized. Life magazine, in an illustrated news story
about the play, disclosed the identity of the Hill family and described the
play as true. 37 The appellate court stated that Life's story was "trade"
under the statute rather than "news," as its purpose was to "attract further
attention to the play, and to increase present and future magazine
238
circulation as well.
The Supreme Court ruled that the "constitutional protections for speech
and press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false
reports of matters of public interest" absent proof that the publisher knew
of their falsity or acted in reckless disregard of the truth. Brennan defined
"matters of public interest" in terms of newsworthiness, defined as public
curiosity. The content of mainstream newspapers and magazines, he
suggested, reflected the public's interest. Not only political news, but
news about personalities and social events, no matter how mundane or
trivial, were newsworthy and therefore fulfilled the function of a free
press, which is to stimulate the discourse "essential... to healthy
government."'239 "The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve
of political expression or comment upon public affairs.., one need only
pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of
published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private
citizens and public officials. ' 2 ' Although the holding was carefully
limited to the New York statute, according to Harry Kalven Jr., it
suggested that the newsworthiness standard had constitutional or nearconstitutional stature. 24' As Kalven observed, in Brennan's opinion,
newsworthiness defined "the ambit of constitutional concern. The
newsworthy is a kind of speech which is public enough so that its
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240. Id. at 387. In his concurrence, Douglas observed that even though Hill was "a private
person," because he had been "catapulted into the news by events over which he has no control," he
and his activities were "in the public domain." Id.
241. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill. Butts, and Walker,
1967 SUP. CT. REv. 267, 283 (1967).
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protection cannot be left entirely to state policy.,

24 2

The Supreme Court has made many efforts in subsequent cases to define
the domain of constitutionally-protected speech on "matters of public
concern," which like "newsworthiness," encompasses a broad array of
material-"expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic,
literary, or ethical matters, '"243 commercial speech, and sexual matter"far more than politics in a narrow sense. ' In cases involving mass
media disclosure of private facts obtained from public records, the Court
suggested that "matters of public concern" encompasses all truthful
information except that which would contravene a "state interest of the
the protection of personal
highest order. ' 245 The Court has yet to define
26
order.,
highest
the
"of
interest
an
privacy as
As this Article has demonstrated, the notion that the public has an
entitlement to know about a wide array of persons and events, one that
overrides individual claims to privacy, has roots that run deep in our social
experience. 24 ' The "right to privacy" and the public disclosure tort
developed in response to fundamental changes that accompanied the
growth of a mass society, changes that created vast public demand for
information about the private affairs of others. The impersonalizing forces
of urbanization and mass population growth generated a sense of
anonymity and alienation. There was a deep need for intimacy in the hard
world of the mass crowd, and gossip and the public revelation of
personality provided it. News about other people's private lives generated
a public identity and public discourse among a diverse mass populace
otherwise lacking common bonds and experiences. From this milieu
developed our modern legal and social systems of privacy and freedom of
expression.
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In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the most recent Supreme Court case involving public disclosure of

private facts, involving the radio broadcasting of conversations obtained by illegal wiretapping, the
Court ruled that federal laws making it illegal to disclose such material are unconstitutional, when
those laws are applied against defendants who do not engage in acts of interception and when the
subjects in the conversation are truthful "matters of public concern," no matter how "mundane" those
issues may be-in this case, a labor dispute involving local teachers. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 535 (2001).
247. Robert Post has described this as "a normative theory of public accountability." Post, Social
Foundations,supra note 10, at 1001.

